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Sustainable Development and Private Global
Governance
Douglas A. Kysar
I.

Introduction: "I'd Like to Buy the World a Coke"

Water is the basis of life; it is the gift of nature; it belongs to all living
beings on earth. It is not a private property but a common resourcefor the
sustenance of all. It is ourfundamental obligation to prevent water scarcity and
pollution and to preserve it for generations. Water is not a commodity. We
should resist all criminal attempts to marketise,privatise and corporatise water.
Only through these means we can ensure the fundamental and inalienableright
to waterfor the people all over the world.1
The Coca-Cola Company's regional website for India proclaims that the
company "exists to benefit and refresh everyone it touches," and that the
company "strive[s] to deliver on this promise every day, creating a stronger
and more sustainable future for our business and for the communities we
serve." 2 Since 1993, Coca-Cola has invested more than $1 billion
throughout India in production facilities, wastewater treatment plants,
distribution systems, and marketing equipment, making it one of the
country's most important international investors. According to its website,
the company directly employs around 6,000 people in India and indirectly
supports employment for another 125,000 people. 3 Also attracting CocaCola's attention is India's growing consumer class. CEO Neville Isdell has
pledged to increase global marketing expenditures by $350-$400 million
starting in 2005, with particular focus on such high-growth markets as Brazil,
China, Russia, and India.4 Presently, nearly 80% of the company's income
comes from markets other than the United States, 5 and Isdell has announced

* Associate Professor, Cornell Law School. For discussion and inspiration, I am grateful to the
symposium participants and especially to its organizer, Jane Cohen. For helpful comments and
suggestions, I thank William Alford, Kelly Busby, Jane Cohen, Jody Freeman, Heather Gerken,
Ryan Goodman, Britton Schwartz, and participants of a faculty workshop at Harvard Law School.

1. Declaration, World Water Conference, Plachimada, Karala, India (Jan. 23, 2004) (on file
with author).
2. Coca-Cola

India,

About

Us--Our

Promise,

at

http://www.coca-

colaindia.com/about_us/abo_our..promise.html.
3. Coca-Cola

India,

Coca-Cola

in

India-Introduction,

at

http://www.coca-

colaindia.com/about_us/abococacolaindiaint.html.
4. Kathleen Sampey, Coke 's Marketing Budget to Rise by $400 Mil., ADWEEK, Nov. 11, 2004,
availableat http://www.adweek.com/aw/search/article display.jsp?vnu contentid=1000718166.
5. Press Release, Coca-Cola Company, The Coca-Cola Company Reports First Quarter Results
(Apr. 19, 2005), availableatHeinOnline
http://www2.coca-cola.com/presscenter/pdfs/first-qtr-results.pdf.
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a long-term target of 95%.6 Indeed, to underscore the importance of Coke's
global growth strategy, Isdell made these announcements during a
presentation to Wall Street analysts titled, "The Coca-Cola Manifesto for
Change."

7

Despite these ambitious goals, growing numbers of activists,
consumers, and investors seem unwilling to sign on to the Coca-Cola
Manifesto and, instead, have launched a concerted effort to undermine the
company's international expansion. Hostile campaigns have arisen, for
instance, in response to Coca-Cola's bottled water marketing practices in
Great Britain, 8 and its alleged complicity with human rights and labor abuses
in Colombia. 9 A great deal of international attention, moreover, has focused
on the company's activities in India, where local citizens' groups charge that
Coca-Cola has failed to live up to its promise to "benefit and refresh
everyone it touches." 10 Specifically, in addition to persistent claims that
Coca-Cola products sold in India fail to meet international safety standards
for DDT and other contaminants," l the company has also faced strong
objections from residents in several Indian communities who attribute the
groundwater shortages that they are suffering to excessive consumption by
local Coca-Cola bottling operations.
The most significant of these
controversies has taken place at Coca-Cola's largest bottling plant in India, 12
a Plachimada, Kerala facility where protestors in January 2005 marked the
1,000th day of a permanent vigil held outside the property's gates.' 3 This
community also marks the location where, one year earlier, protestors issued
the Plachimada Water Declaration quoted at the outset of this Introduction.

6. Coca Cola Looks at India, Chinafor the Fizz, ECONOMIC TIMES, Nov. 11, 2004, availableat
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/922772.cms.
7. Sampey, supra note 4.
8. See Lyn White, Coke's Water Withdrawn, FOODWEEK, Apr. 2, 2004 (noting that Coca-Cola
withdrew its Dasani bottled water product from the U.K. market following revelations that the
product was deceptively marketed and contained bromate, a carcinogen, at twice government
acceptable levels), available at 2004 WLNR 77623.
9. See Scott Leith & Matt Kempner, Coca-Cola Co.: Scuffle, Catcalls Spice Meeting, ATLANTA
J.-CONST., Apr. 22, 2004, at 1F (noting that protestors at Coca-Cola's annual shareholder meeting
alleged complicity by the company with the deaths of nine union organizers in Columbia during the
past decade), availableat 2004 WLNR 6350331.
10. Coca-Cola
India,
About
Us--Our
Promise,
at
http://www.cocacolaindia.com/aboutus/abo_our.-promise.html.
11. See India Orders Coke and Pepsi to Warn About Pesticide Content, INDUS. MAINTENANCE
& PLANT OPERATION, Jan. 2005 (reporting that both Coca-Cola and Pepsi "received a setback after
a well-publicized test conducted by a Delhi-based environmental group revealed that their products
contain large doses of lindane, DDT, chlorpyrifos, malathion and other toxins"), available at 2005
WLNR 1025765.
12. See Mark Williams, Drought-It's the Real Thing, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Feb. 12,
2005, at F2.
13. See Press Release, India Resource Center, Community Commemorates Thousand Day
Anniversary
of
Vigil
Against
Coca-Cola
in
Kerala
(Jan.
13,
2005),
at
HeinOnline -- 83 Tex L. Rev. 2110 2004-2005
http://www.indiaresource.org/press/2005/plachimadablockjan.html.

2005]

Sustainable Development and Private Global Governance

2111

Originally opened in 2000,14 the Plachimada facility was viewed by
political leaders as precisely the kind of foreign investment that enables
economic growth and, ultimately, sustainable development. 15 Nevertheless,
the plant has been shut down since December 2003 in the wake of an adverse
court ruling and a suspension order from the state government, both of which
were issued following claims by the local Plachimada council that Coca-Cola
contributed to water shortages by significantly drawing down groundwater
resources and by discharging lead and cadmium-containing sludge into local
surface watercourses.1 6 While still in operation, the plant consumed somewhere between 500,000 and 1,500,000 liters of water per day to produce a
variety of bottled soda and mineral water drinks. 17 Activists have been quick
to point out that most of the affected Plachimada people are unable to afford
the very beverages that the local groundwater was being used to produce.
Instead, village residents-who include primarily landless indigenous
Adivasis and outcaste Dalits-have been forced to carry potable water8 from
neighboring areas back to their homes for drinking and cooking needs. 1
Similar events have been unfolding in at least four other communities
within India. In Kaladera, Rajasthan, for instance, the governmental water
agency issued a report determining that Coca-Cola's local operations had
severely impacted groundwater levels and led to "ecological imbalance" in
the area.19 Numerous protests followed.20 Similarly, in Mehdiganj, Uttar
Pradesh, approximately 1,000 community members marched to a Coca-Cola
facility that they believed had adversely affected their water supplies. That
protest, held on November 24, 2004, led to the arrest of 200 marchers and
numerous allegations of injury after "police beat back villagers attempting to
break a cordon.",21 For its part, in each of these cases Coca-Cola strongly
disputes the scientific foundation of the claims being made against it. The
company insists, for instance, that groundwater shortages in Plachimada are
due to drought conditions unrelated to the company's activities, that
numerous other water users in the area meet or exceed the plant's
consumption levels, and that, in order to mitigate any impact on water

14. John Vidal, Coke on Trial as Indian Villagers Accuse Plant of Sucking Them Dry,
GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 19, 2003, available at 2003 WLNR 4673911.
15. Liz Stuart, Multinationals Should Face the Same Rules No Matter Where They Set Up Shop,

THE GUARDIAN (London), Aug. 11, 2003 (noting Kerala's granting of an investment rebate to
Coca-Cola for establishing the plant in an impoverished region), available at 2003 WLNR 4651146.
16. Williams, supra note 12.
17. Eva Wrammer, Fighting Cocacolanisation in Plachimada: Water, Soft Drinks and a Tragedy
of the Commons in an Indian Village 30 (2004) (unpublished thesis, Lund University) (on file with
author).
18. Id. at29, 33.
19. Water Board Disputes Coca-Cola's Claim on Ground Water, THE HINDU (India), June 17,
2004, available at 2004 WLNR 10012581.
20. Marchers Against Coca-Cola Court Arrest, THE HINDU (India), Sept. 29, 2004, available at
2004 WLNR 11891863.
-- 83 Tex L. Rev. 2111 2004-2005
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availability that the plant does have, the company has engaged in an
extensive rainwater harvesting project at the site.22 Whatever their merits,
these defenses have failed to satisfy local protestors. Instead, as will be
discussed below, the controversy has expanded to include significant
international dimensions.23
The Plachimada groundwater dispute may be seen as a microcosm of
what many believe is a coming century of global water conflict. 24 The
United Nations Population Fund estimates that today more than half of all
available freshwater is appropriated for use by the world's 6.1 billion people,
and that by 2025, 70% of available freshwater will need to be harnessed
simply in order to keep pace with population growth.25 If, instead, all of the
world's people consume water in 2025 at the rate presently used by developed world residents, fully 90% of freshwater will need to be appropriated
for human consumption.26 Stark as they are, these figures may understate the
full extent of freshwater resource constraints, given the great uncertainty involved in estimating groundwater availability and use.27 Some believe that
as many as 200 billion net cubic meters of groundwater are being withdrawn
from aquifers each year-a practice of aquifer "mining" or "overdrafting"
that renders sustainability planning especially problematic.28 In India, where
almost 60% of the population relies on groundwater for drinking and
sanitation needs, 29 aquifer depletion carries particularly severe consequences,
often forcing residents to travel long distances for daily water retrieval or

22. See

Coca-Cola

India,

Approach

to

Water

Usage,

at

http://www.coca-

colaindia.com/water.html.
23. See discussion infra subpart Ill(A).
24. For instance, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan recently acknowledged
"growing concern over a 'global water crisis' resulting from increased demand for finite water
resources, contamination of water supplies, and degradation of ecosystems due to mismanagement
of water." FreshwaterManagement: Progress in Meeting the Goals, Targets and Commitments of
Agenda 21, the Programmefor FurtherImplementation ofAgenda 21, and the JohannesburgPlan
of Implementation: Report of the Secretary-General,U.N. ESCOR Comm. on Sustainable Dev.,
12th Sess., Agenda Item 3(a), at 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.17/2004/4 (2004) [hereinafter Report of the
Secretary-General,
Freshwater
Management],
available
at
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/csd/csdl2/csdl2 docs.htm; see also Sandra L. Postel & Aaron T.
Wolf, Dehydrating Conflict, FOREIGN POLICY, Sept.-Oct. 2001, at 60, 65 (observing that "[t]he
unprecedented degree of water stress is creating more zero-sum situations .. . both within and
between countries").
25. UNITED NATIONS POPULATION FUND, THE STATE OF WORLD POPULATION 2001:
FOOTPRINTS AND MILESTONES: POPULATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 11 (2001), available

at http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2001/english/index.html.
26. Id.
27. U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., RETHINKING THE APPROACH TO GROUNDWATER AND FOOD

SECURITY 17 (2003), availableat ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/005/y4495E/y4495eOO.pdf.
28. See Payal Sampat, Uncovering Groundwater Pollution, in STATE OF THE WORLD 2001: A
WORLDWATCH INSTITUTE REPORT ON PROGRESS TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY 21, 23 (Linda

Starcke ed., 2001).
29. Cent. Pollution Control Bd., Gov't of India Ministry of Env't & Forests, Groundwater, at
HeinOnline -- 83
Tex L. Rev. 2112 2004-2005
http://www.cpcb.nic.in/groundwater/chl
50703.htm.
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simply to abandon their homes and communities in search of other places to
live.
Unfortunately, such conditions may become more common in the
future, not less. The World Health Organization estimates that if present
trends continue, two-thirds of the world's population will live under
moderate to high water stress by 2025.30 In order to reverse those trends and
to instead meet the international development goal of halving the proportion
of people without access to water for basic needs by 2015, the United
Nations (U.N.) projects that the number of people served by drinking and
sanitation water supplies will need to increase by 1.6 billion and 2 billion
Such a massive increase in infrastructure
individuals, respectively. 3
obviously will require a massive expenditure of funds; in fact, the U.N.
estimates that global spending on water supply and sanitation will need to be
at least doubled in order to meet the identified development targets.32 In
light of a variety of related forces-including pressure from international
financial institutions, growing political momentum behind privatization and
deregulation, and the sheer economic clout of multinational corporationsanalysts expect much of this increased spending to occur through publicprivate partnerships of various configurations.3 3 Accordingly, many see
important economic opportunities ahead for the supply and management of
water. A much-quoted article in Fortune magazine, for instance, claimed
that "[w]ater promises to be to the 21st century what oil was to the 3420th
century: the precious commodity that determines the wealth of nations."
This Article utilizes recent controversy over Coca-Cola's alleged depletion of groundwater resources in India as a vehicle for exploring competing
conceptions of global environmental governance and the role of private
actors within them. Initially, it uses the Coca-Cola groundwater situation to
identify core substantive and procedural meanings that lurk within the
otherwise ingeniously ambiguous concept of sustainable development.
Through this exercise, it is shown that-when properly understood-the
sustainable development paradigm requires at a minimum some collective

30. WHO/UNICEF JOINT MONITORING PROGRAMME FOR WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION,
GLOBAL WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION ASSESSMENT 2000 REPORT 32 (2000), available at

http://www.who.int/water-sanitationhealth/monitoring/globalassess/en/.
31. Report of the Secretary-General,FreshwaterManagement,supra note 24, at 21; Sanitation:
Progress in Meeting the Goals, Targets and Commitments of Agenda 21, the Programme for
FurtherImplementation ofAgenda 21, and the JohannesburgPlan of Implementation: Report of the
Secretary-General,U.N. ESCOR Comm. on Sustainable Dev., 12th Sess., Agenda Item 3, at 19,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.17/2004/5 (2004) [hereinafter, Report of the Secretary-General, Sanitation],
availableat http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/csd/csdl2/csd 12_docs.htm.
32. Report of the Secretary-General,FreshwaterManagement, supra note 24, at 20-21; Report
of the Secretary-General,Sanitation, supra note 31, at 7.
33. PETER H. GLEICK ET AL., THE NEW ECONOMY OF WATER: THE RISKS AND BENEFITS OF
GLOBALIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION OF FRESH WATER, at vii (2002), available at

http://www.pacinst.org/reports/new-economy-of water/new-economyoLwater.pdf.
15, 2000, at 342, 344.
May
Water Everywhere,
34. Shawn Tully, Water, HeinOnline
-- 83 TexFORTUNE,
L. Rev. 2113
2004-2005
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response to the question, "Sustainability of what?' 35 This necessity of
collective response, however, stands in considerable tension with the
premises of market liberalism that drive such political and economic trends
as global market integration; privatization and commodification of water and
other natural resources; and cost-benefit review of environmental, health,
and safety regulations. By clarifying this and other points of normative and
empirical disagreement between sustainable development and market
liberalism-including points that previously have been unidentified or
underappreciated in the literature-this Article aims to provide an impetus
and an outline for more searching inspection of both frameworks.
In addition, this Article seeks to describe, and to a lesser extent defend,
a growing effort among proponents of sustainable development to adapt their
sustainability goals to the framework of market liberalism itself.
Specifically, by promoting various methods of downstreaming information
regarding social and environmental impacts of production to individuals
acting in market capacities, these proponents hope to inspire governance
mechanisms that better resonate with the market-liberal grundnormen of consumer sovereignty and shareholder supremacy. Again using the Coca-Cola
groundwater situation as an example, this Article speculates that promotion
of conscientious consumption and socially responsible investment in this
manner ultimately may prove more significant than any number of attempts
to refine the conceptual meaning of sustainability. Although handicapped in
obvious ways by their dependence on altruistic economic gestures to
overcome dramatic collective action problems, these campaigns to encourage
publicly-oriented market behavior do have the great virtue of avoiding headon confrontation between the competing theoretical conceptions of
sustainable development and market liberalism-a confrontation that
observers increasingly seem to suspect would favor market liberalism.
II.

Sustainable Development: Sustainability of What?

Water law provides a unique vehicle for exploring conceptions of sustainable development. Its subject matter concerns a natural resource that at
any given moment is finite, unevenly distributed, generally nonsubstitutable,
and-most critically-essential for the maintenance of life. 36
Thus,
designers of water law must aspire not only to achieve efficiency in the
allocation of water resources, but also to ensure equity in their distribution

35. Cf Amartya Sen, Equality of What?, in EQUAL FREEDOM: SELECTED TANNER LECTURES
ON HUMAN VALUES 327-29 (Stephen Darwall ed., 1995) (noting the failure of various moral
theories of equality because they do not account for "need" and thereby leave the question"Equality of what?"--unanswered).
36. Cf Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Water Allocation and Protection:A United States Case Study,
in EARTH SYSTEMS: PROCESSES AND ISSUES 476, 476 (W.G. Ernest ed., 2000) [hereinafter
Thompson, Water Allocation and Protection] ("Water is indispensable to life and to all forms of
economic development."). HeinOnline -- 83 Tex L. Rev. 2114 2004-2005
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and sustainability in their scale and manner of usage. 37 For at least two
decades, the international legal community has attempted to harmonize these
various aims into a single conceptual framework of sustainable
development. 38 As defined most famously by the Brundtland Report in
1987, sustainable development is "development that meets the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
own needs.",39 Following this prominent endorsement, the term has taken on
a life of its own, finding diverse expression in all manner of environmental
treaties, trade agreements, international aid programs, presidential council
reports, state and local planning schemes, corporate mission statements,
40
investment fund charters, NGO policy documents, and so on.
Despite, or perhaps because of, this enormous degree of attention and
apparent acceptance, the results of the sustainable development movement
have been decidedly mixed, both in terms of conceptual clarity and programmatic success. Nevertheless, some commentators regard sustainable
development as having generated a discrete area of international law, consisting of "a corpus of international legal principles and treaties, which
address the areas of intersection between international economic law, international environmental law, and international social law.",4 1 Several of these
principles can be found in the International Law Association's New Delhi
Declaration on Principles of International Law Relating to Sustainable
Development, which provides a cumbersome, but relatively complete,
statement:
[T]he objective of sustainable development involves a comprehensive
and integrated approach to economic, social and political processes,
which aims at the sustainable use of natural resources of the Earth and
the protection of the environment on which nature and human life as
well as social and economic development depend and which seeks to
realize the right of all human beings to an adequate living standard on
the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in
37. This tripartite conceptual division forms the intellectual core of ecological economics, a
field that is distinguishable from neoclassical economics based on its insistence that questions of
equity and scale should be seen as analytically prior to questions of efficiency. See HERMAN DALY,
BEYOND GROWTH: THE ECONOMICS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 45-51 (1996).

38. The term "sustainable development" is generally traced to a 1980 report issued by the
International Union for the Conservation of Nature in cooperation with the World Wildlife Fund
and the United Nations Environment Programme. See Norman J. Vig, Introduction to THE GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENT: INSTITUTIONS, LAW, AND POLICY 1, 6 (Norman J. Vig & Regina S. Axelrod eds.,
1999) [hereinafter THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT].
39. THE WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE
(THE BRUNDTLAND REPORT) 43 (1987).
40. See, e.g., JOHN PEZZEY, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT CONCEPTS: AN ECONOMIC

ANALYSIS 55-62 (World Bank Env't Paper No. 2, Report No. 11425, 1992) (surveying conceptions
of sustainability), availableat http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlelWDSContentServer/
WDSP/IB/1999/10/21/000178830_98101911160728/Rendered/PDF/multi-page.pdf.
41. MARIE-CLAIRE CORDONIER SEGGER & ASHFAQ KHALFAN, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
368
(2004).
AND PROSPECTS
LAW: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES,HeinOnline
-- 83 Tex
L. Rev.
2115 2004-2005

2116

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 83:2109

development and in the fair distribution of benefits resulting
therefrom, with
due regard to the needs and interests of future
42
generations.
Distilled to its essence, this declaration identifies five aims that one may take
to form the core of the still-emerging sustainable development paradigm:
integrated policy assessment, environmental sustainability, intragenerational
equity, robust political participation, and intergenerational responsibility.43
Simultaneously with the rise of sustainable development thinking, the
international community also seems to have tightened its embrace of the tenets of market liberalism-that is, a neoliberal political philosophy of limited
government and strong property rights, coupled with what one might call a
cultural exaltation of the market, both as a primary locus for individual
growth and expression and as a dominant template for policy design and
implementation in those few instances where public action is seen as
necessary. 44 Such a framework provides much of the intellectual foundation
for the continuing global integration of markets in goods and services, the
move toward privatization and deregulation of government functions, and the
increasingly prominent role of cost-benefit analysis in environmental, health,
and safety standard-setting. Even the "unique" resource of water has been
touched by these trends: Consumers worldwide have embraced the
commodification of water in branded, bottled form; 45 the Safe Drinking
42. Letter Dated 6 August 2002 from the Permanent Representative of Bangladesh to the
United Nations and the Charg d'affaires a.i. of the PermanentMission of the Netherlands to the
United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-Generalof the United Nations, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess.,
Provisional Agenda Item 89, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/57/329 (2002).
43. These various aims of the sustainable development framework tend to reappear in subjectspecific ways once the framework is used to generate policy recommendations. With respect to
water, for instance, the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation calls for the adoption of integrated
water-resources management, an approach that "involves allocation of water among those
competing uses, and among users within each sector, promoting productive and efficient uses of the
water, and protecting water quality, so as to promote long-term economic growth, social
development, and environmental protection."
Report of the Secretary-General, Freshwater
Management, supra note 24, at 13-14. Within the United States, the well-respected Long's Peak
Working Group on National Water Policy produced a report in the early 1990s that similarly sought
to integrate water use efficiency and conservation, ecological integrity and restoration, clean water,
and equitable participatory decisionmaking, all within a framework of sustainability. See Reed D.
Benson, Recommendations for an Environmentally Sound Policy on Western Water, 17 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 247, 255 (1998) (describing the Group's report, AMERICA'S WATERS: A NEW ERA OF
SUSTAINABILITY).
44. See generally Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product
Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARv. L. REv. 525, 526 (2004)
(discussing "the effort by regulatory cost-benefit analysts to ground public policies on the values
revealed by individuals acting in their roles as market actors").
45. See ROBERT GLENNON, WATER FOLLIES: GROUNDWATER PUMPING AND THE FATE OF
AMERICA'S FRESH WATERS 1-2 (2002) (noting that bottled water usage is prevalent throughout
Europe, South America, and the United States). An increasingly significant share of Coca-Cola's
revenue, for instance, comes from bottled water products. See Paul Simao, Bottled Water War Cuts
Into Profits, CALGARY HERALD, Jan. 31, 2004, at D8 (noting that "Coca-Cola and PepsiCo are
struggling with sluggish soft-drink sales in North America, their largest market, and are therefore
keen to protect their burgeoning
water businesses").
HeinOnline
-- 83 Tex L. Rev. 2116 2004-2005
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Water Act in the United States has attempted to rationalize the setting of
health and safety standards through the discipline of economic cost-benefit
analysis; 46 governments in South America and other areas of the world have
experimented with private management and ownership of municipal water
facilities; 47 and growing numbers of private bulk water transfers have raised
the prospect that water may be brought firmly within the international trading
rules, including especially those governing export restrictions.4 8
Proponents contend that this "market-liberal order is both natural and
ethical" 4 and, in fact, represents the most powerful vehicle available to
achieve the aims of sustainable development. 50 Using the five identified core
principles of sustainable development, however, this Part argues that the two
frameworks appear to be deeply inconsistent, once one begins to attach
specific content to the notion of sustainability and to look more closely at the
embedded normative assumptions of market liberalism. As will be seen,
market liberalism offers a more substantively detailed program for analysis
than sustainable development, no doubt at least partially due to its close
association with the technically sophisticated discipline of welfare
economics. Much of this Part therefore consists of burrowing deep within
various aspects of market liberalism in order to excavate assumptions or
ideals that, once revealed, appear to be in tension with sustainable
development's less textured, but still widely endorsed prescriptions. The
fundamental purpose of this discussion is not to endorse one paradigm over
the other, but rather to force proponents of market liberalism and sustainable
development alike to grapple with the profound questions that are raised by
these underappreciated differences between them.
Sustainable development in particular might benefit from such a
confrontation. To date, one could argue that the conceptual failings of the
sustainable development paradigm-chiefly its vagueness and inability to
guide concrete policy choices-have been driven by the reluctance of
sustainability proponents to admit the full extent of incompatibility between
their paradigm and that of the market-liberal order. On the other hand, much
of the sustainable development paradigm's international salience is no doubt
attributable to its underdetermined nature: Amorphous and ill-specified, the
concept allows various parties with potentially conflicting agendas to coexist

46. See Cass R. Sunstein, Arithmetic for Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J. 2255, 2267-69 (2002)
(describing the statutory scheme).
47. See generally WORLD BANK, PRIVATIZATION AND BASIC INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES FOR

THE URBAN POOR (2001) (reviewing infrastructure privatization projects in Latin America),
availableat http://econdev.forumone.com.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 157-159.
49. James A. Dom, The Case for Market Liberalism, Cato Institute, available at
http://www.cato.org/dailys/01-20-04.html (Jan. 20, 2004).
50. See generally WILFRED BECKERMAN, A POVERTY OF REASON:
SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 52-56 (2003) (discussing the market's role in
HeinOnline -- 83 Tex L. Rev. 2117 2004-2005
environmental policy).
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under the same big tent. A basic premise of this Article is that the tensions
among these various parties ultimately need to be addressed and resolved in
order for significant policy progress to be achieved in the areas of
environment and development. 51 Toward that end, this Part identifies some
of the more troublesome inconsistencies lurking beneath the tent.
A. IntergenerationalEquity and the DiscountRate
Perhaps the most widely accepted meaning of sustainable development
is that there is some obligation to consider and protect the interests of future
generations in relation to the natural environment.52 This responsibility
usually is translated as a "need to preserve natural resources for the benefit of
future generations." 53 Sustainable development therefore obligates present
generations not to exhaust or impair certain natural resources, such as unique
wilderness areas or endangered species, that are viewed as part of the

51. This point should not be overstated. International law scholars have waged a sophisticated
debate regarding the degree of precision that is optimal in order to obtain broad participation within
international legal regimes while still fostering substantively useful norms of conduct. For an
overview of this debate and an important contribution using evidence regarding the processes of
acculturation as applied to states, see Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States:
Socialization and International Human Rights Law, Harvard Law School Public Law & Legal

Theory Research Paper Series Research Paper No. 95, The University Of Chicago Law School
Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series Research Paper No. 62 36-45, available at
Along these lines, one might argue
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract_id=519565.
that sustainable development's conceptual "thinness" has achieved the goal of widespread, indeed
near universal endorsement, but that the concept must now begin to "thicken" in order for it to
promote an acculturation process that has real normative bite. Support for this argument can be
inferred from the recent experience of delegates to the Thirteenth Session of the United Nations
Commission On Sustainable Development (CSD), which was held earlier this year in New York
City. See International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin CSD-13
Final, Apr. 25, 2005, available at http://www/iisd/ca/csd/csdl3. This session was intended by
conveners to constitute a "Policy Session" meeting during which delegates would develop specific,
practical plans for implementing the substantive goals that they had negotiated during the previous
year's "Review Session." However, many delegates reported that "there was little continuity
between the two CSD sessions," and that the negotiations were bogged down by "reptitions,
redundant discussions and inefficiencies." Id. at 9. This arguable failure of the CSD's two-year
"Implementation Cycle" process may have much to do with the degree of imprecision and false
consensus that characterizes even basic discussions oriented around sustainability.
52. As Edith Brown Weiss has put it, "[t]he mandate for sustainable development is inherently
intergenerational." Edith Brown Weiss, The Emerging Structure of International Environmental
Law, in THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT, supra note 38, at 98, 106. See also Edith Brown Weiss,
Intergenerational Equity: A Legal Framework for Global Environmental Change, in
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 385, 385 (Edith Brown Weiss ed., 1992)

("Sustainable development rests on a commitment to equity with future generations."). Such
concern predates formal recognition of the sustainable development framework. For instance, the
first tenet of modem American environmental law's first major statute, the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, underscored "the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the
environment for succeeding generations." National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 101, 42
U.S.C. § 433 l(b)(1) (2000).
53. PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 253 (2d ed.
HeinOnline
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"common heritage of humankind., 54 More broadly, the framework also
demands that present generations avoid disrupting the basic integrity of those
ecological systems upon which all life and human activity are thought to
depend.
Recognizing that the earth's vital biophysical processes are
characterized by uncertainty, irreversibilities, critical thresholds, and other
hallmark features of complex, dynamic systems, proponents of sustainable
development argue that present generations should establish "safe minimum
standards... for protecting Earth's life-support systems in the face of
virtually inevitable unpleasant surprises. 55
Not only does this characterization of sustainable development seem to
presuppose the existence of some collective community of interest beyond
the mere agglomeration of individual interests-for how else is one to
conceptualize obligations between generations?-but it also seems to
necessitate the specification and imposition of a particular conception of the
good. That is, because the "developmental and environmental needs
of... fiture generations" must be honored by the presently living, collective
decisionmaking must be undertaken concerning what those "needs" will
include-a process that seems unavoidably to entail some degree of
endorsement or condemnation of particular technologies, preferences, and
values.56 Indeed, even if proponents of sustainable development attempt to
reduce the perceived illiberal impact of their framework by resting the

54. Presently, the "common heritage" concept has a somwhat more narrow, technical meaning
within international environmental law. See COMMITTEE ON LEGAL ASPECTS OF SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, SEARCHING FOR THE CONTOURS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE FIELD OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, FINAL CONFERENCE

REPORT 10 (2002) [hereinafter ILA, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT] (explaining the notion of the
"common heritage of humankind" in which global commons that lie beyond national jurisdiction,
such as the deep-sea bed, celestial bodies, and Antarctica, are regulated and controlled through
principles such as nonappropriation, nonexclusive and peaceful use, and equitable sharing of
benefits), available at http://www.ila-hq.org/htmllmain listofcommsustdev.htm.
However,
proponents of sustainable development often seek to expand the notion beyond strictly
extraterritorial resources, given the enormous degree of global ecological interdependence that they
believe characterizes even those activities or life forms that appear to exist exclusively within state
borders. See SEGGER & KHALFAN, supra note 41, at 120 (noting compromise position under the
United Nations Convention on Biodiversity, in which delegates identified the preservation of
biological diversity as a "common concern" of humankind).
55. Paul R. Ehrlich, Ecological Economics and the Carrying Capacity of Earth, in INVESTING
IN NATURAL CAPITAL: THE ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS APPROACH TO SUSTAINABILITY 38, 49
(AnnMari Jansson et al. eds., 1994).
56. The Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, for instance, identifies "changing unsustainable
patterns of production and consumption" as an "overarching objective[] of, and essential
requirement[] for, sustainable development." U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, DIv. OF
SUSTAINABLE DEV., PLAN OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WORLD SUMMIT ON SUSTAINABLE

DEVELOPMENT
2
(2002),
available
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/WSSDPOIPD/English/WSSDPlanlmpl.pdf.

at
See also

Sir Aaron Klug, Forewordto TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE CONSUMPTION: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

iii (Brian Heap & Jennifer Kent eds., 2000) (noting that evidence on the environmental
sustainability of present patterns of consumption suggest a necessity of "major changes in the
-- 83 Tex L. Rev.
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"needs" determination on a primarily empirical and scientific basis,
collective moral decisionmaking still will need to enter into the equation, if
degree of risk avernowhere else than in the specification of an appropriate
57
uncertainty.
scientific
to
response
sion to adopt in
Proponents of the market-liberal paradigm, in contrast, generally regard
self-interested personal decisionmaking within the market as the surest route
to overall well-being and a just society. The problem with this conception in
the intergenerational context, of course, is that the unregulated market insufficiently registers the needs and preferences of the unborn. 5 8 To be sure,
members of present generations do exhibit some altruistic regard for
members of the generations that follow them, in particular for their own
children and grandchildren. But this is not the same as a market paradigm in
which each generation's complete set of interests receives simultaneous
expression. 59 Similarly, firms do have an incentive to anticipate future profit
opportunities that might include the resource needs of future generations, but
only insofar as those opportunities are measured against the best available
alternative use of resources. Thus, while firms may engage in some level of
anticipation of the "needs" of future generations, they will only conserve
resources to satisfy those needs if the rate of return from conservation
exceeds the market rate of interest. The market rate of interest, however,
reflects a confluence of economic and behavioral forces that have little to do
with a theory of intergenerational equity, at least not in the absence of some
socially imposed constraint such as forced savings of natural resources.60
For these reasons, neoclassical economists-whose theoretical work
provides market liberalism's most sophisticated response to the sustainable
development challenge--do not support unregulated market allocation as the
appropriate mechanism for ensuring sustainability. 61 Nevertheless, they do
typically premise their sustainability policy recommendations on an
analytically similar notion of discounted utility maximization, which is used

57. See infra text accompanying notes 121-123 (describing more fundamental ways in which an

objectivist approach to risk regulation remains elusive).
58. See Geoffrey Heal, Markets and Sustainability, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, THE ECONOMY
AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: THE UNITED STATES, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 410, 422-24 (Richard L. Revesz et al. eds., 2000) (noting that
"normal intertemporal economic problems and long-term environmental problems have quite
different time scales and involve different issues").
59. See Jerome Rothenberg, Intergenerational Ethics, Efficiency, and Commitment, in
DISCOUNTING AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 103, 103-04 (Paul R. Portney & John P. Weyant
eds., 1999) (discussing challenges both to the formation of "general normative principles" of
intergenerational ethics and to the establishment of intergenerational asset markets that might render
such principles less necessary).
60. See infra text accompanying notes 85-97.
61. See P.S. DASGUPTA & G.M. HEAL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCES
472 (1979) (noting the necessity of effective ways to address environmental externality problems,
such as the development and enforcement of private property rights or the control of responsible
or taxation).-- 83 Tex L. Rev. 2120 2004-2005
agents through regulation HeinOnline
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to identify an "optimal consumption path" across time.62 In fact, as several
leading researchers observe, "[o]ne interesting aspect of the optimal
consumption path according to the [discounted utility maximization]
criterion is that it can be linked, theoretically, to the outcome of a
decentralized market economy."' 63 Specifically, within an idealized society
in which all individuals discount utility at a uniform specified rate, all
markets are both competitive and free of externalities, and a complete set of
futures markets exists, "the time path of consumption will correspond to the
optimal consumption path [without regulation]." 64
At first glance, this vision seems to suggest that, so long as society "gets
the prices right," sustainability can be achieved through market dynamics
alone, without any need for collective determinations regarding resource
conservation. Nevertheless, care must be taken to distinguish between
intergenerational efficiency and intergenerational equity.6 5 Even in the
idealized conception, an "optimal consumption path" does not guarantee any
particular level of consumption for a given time period. Put differently,
although the "standard policy remedies for improving economic efficiencylike establishing property rights, addressing externalities and so forth"-may
help to maximize the net present value of aggregate intergenerational utility,
they "do not guarantee sustainability." 66 Instead, in order to constitute truly
sustainable development, society must at a minimum supplement the discounted utility maximization criterion with an additional requirement that
discounted utility not be permitted to decrease over time.6 7 Because utility is
difficult both to measure and to bequeath, this requirement generally is taken
to mean that the aggregate stock of productive capital-whether natural,
technological, social, or otherwise-should be maintained at a nondeclining
level.68

As Robert Stavins, Alexander Wagner, and Gernot Wagner have
insightfully explained, the criterion of intergenerational efficiency can be
thought of as conceptually analogous to the criterion of Kaldor-Hicks

62. Kenneth Arrow et al., Are We Consuming Too Much?, 18 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Summer
2004, at 147, 148 ("Economic analysis has tended to emphasize the criterion of maximizing the
present discounted value of current and future utility from consumption . .
63. Id. at 150.
64. Id.
65. See SUDHIR ANAND & AMARTYA SEN, SUSTAINABLE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: CONCEPTS

AND PRIORITIES § 3.2 (1994) ("[Tlhere is no general presumption that sustainability will be implied
available
at
of
intertemporal
allocation."),
by
optimality
in
models

http://hdr.undp.org/docs/publications/ocational-papers/Oc8c.htm.
66. See Arrow et al., supra note 62, at 154-55.
67. See id. at 155.
68. Before sustainable development became a pervasive notion, John Rawls similarly argued
that "[e]ach generation must not only preserve the gains of culture and civilization, and maintain
intact those just institutions that they have established, but it must also put aside ineach period of
time a suitable amount of real capital accumulation" until an appropriate "steady state" can be
HeinOnline
-- 83 Tex
L. Rev.(1971).
2121 2004-2005
achieved. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY
OF JUSTICE
285-87

2122

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 83:2109

efficiency in the intragenerational context. Just as Kaldor-Hicks efficient
policy moves could in theory become both efficient and "equitable" (because
the winners from the policy moves could compensate the losers and still
come out ahead),69 intergenerationally efficient consumption paths could in
theory become both efficient and "sustainable" (because the winning
generations could transfer enough resources to the losing generations to
ensure a nondeclining utility path). 70 Accordingly, just as Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency often is known as potential Pareto efficiency, Stavins, Wagner,
efficiency should be thought of as
and Wagner suggest that intergenerational
"potential sustainability.", 7 1 The researchers hope that this conceptual
clarification will enable proponents of market liberalism and sustainable
development to peacefully coexist: Neoclassical growth theorists and other
supporters of market liberalism can focus their policy recommendations on
the maximization of intergenerational efficiency, while sustainable
development advocates can use the "political process" to redistribute the
ensuing gains among present and future generations.72
Several important qualifications apply here. First, "equity" is being
equated with a standard-Pareto optimality-that has important limitations
as a moral benchmark, even if one assumes that the necessary compensatory
payments or resource transfers will actually be accomplished. As Amartya
Sen has noted in the intragenerational context, because Pareto optimality
does not permit inspection of the underlying distribution of initial
entitlements, "a society or an economy can be Pareto-optimal and still be
perfectly disgusting., 73 The limitations of the criterion are made more
troublesome in this context because, even as the researchers endorse a
conceptual separation between efficiency and equity in the intergenerational
context, they simultaneously express doubt that their hypothesized
intergenerational transfers will actually occur. Indeed, Stavins, Wagner, and

69. Robert N. Stavins et al., InterpretingSustainabilityin Economic Terms: Dynamic Efficiency
Plus IntergenerationalEquity, 79 ECON. LETTERS 339, 341 (2003). Although they are relevant to
this Article only insofar as they help to excavate conceptual distinctions between sustainable
development and market liberalism, standard criticisms of this welfare economic conception do
merit brief acknowledgment here: Willingness-to-pay, the usual preferentialist value criterion
adopted by Kaldor-Hicks efficiency analysis, risks privileging the wealthy, ignoring the offerasking problem, and unduly favoring the status quo; any preferentialist account of welfare is subject
to the claim that preference satisfaction and well-being are imperfectly correlated; the goal of
maximizing net gains in aggregate welfare masks significant moral, political, and practical reasons
that people might have for trumping the maximization goal in particular circumstances; and the
individualistic approach of market liberalism denies the existence of shared human values as such,
let alone values that might be said to belong to nonhuman interests independently of their
contribution to individual human welfare. See Douglas A. Kysar, Climate Change, Cultural
Transformation, and Comprehensive Rationality, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 555 (2004)
(reviewing such criticisms in relation to cost-benefit analysis of climate change).
70. Stavins et al., supra note 69, at 341-42.
71. Id. at 342.
72. Id. at 343.
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Wagner explain that the very fact that "utility transfers between generations
are difficult to operationalize ...provides an additional reason why more
useful policy statements can be made by being satisfied with potential
transfers., 74 The mere possibility of intergenerational resource transfers is
therefore held to support a particular-and arguably narrow--construction of
intergenerational efficiency, even when the likelihood of such transfers is
understood to be low. Most advocates of sustainable development will be
unsatisfied with this reasoning, given their overriding concern for the actual
legacy bestowed upon future generations.75
Second, even assuming that intergenerational resource transfers could
become reliably operationalized, the proposed conception still seems to
assume perfect substitutability among the variety of capital resources that
generate utility. That is, so long as capital of any description is retained in
sufficient amounts to support a nondeclining stream of utility, proponents of
this "weak" version of sustainability appear to be indifferent concerning the
precise composition of the resource base that is bequeathed to future
generations.76 For proponents of weak sustainability, any contrary attempt to
preserve a particular portfolio of natural capital assets for future generations
poses an insurmountable empirical challenge that is destined to cause wasteful or paternalistic resource decisionmaking. In Plachimada, for instance,
some 2,000 families allegedly are affected by the groundwater drawdown.
The Coca-Cola bottling facility, on the other hand, provides employment for
over 200 workers and serves as an important component of the company's
overall Indian operations. 77 Perhaps the most "sustainable" use under these
circumstances is simply to draw the groundwater down and convert it into
commodity goods that can be sold for profit, thereby creating a fund of
financial capital to be invested in other projects. In order to promote
nondeclining utility over time, proponents of weak sustainability simply
would require some policy assurance that a portion of the proceeds from
resource exhaustion actually was being reinvested in reproducible capital.78
74. See Stavins et al., supra note 69, at 342 n.8.
75. Cf William R. Cline, Discounting for the Very Long Term, in DISCOUNTING AND
INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY, supra note 59, at 131 ("Discounting over centuries at today's return
on capital implicitly makes a commitment that is not credible: that society will keep reinvesting at
this rate to compensate distant future generations for damages imposed.").
76. See Arrow et al., supra note 62, at 151 ("Even if some resources such as stocks of minerals
are drawn down along a consumption path, the sustainability criterion could nevertheless be
satisfied if other capital assets were accumulated sufficiently to offset the resource decline.");
Robert M. Solow, An Almost PracticalStep Toward Sustainability, 19 RESOURCES POL'Y 162, 168
(1993) ("The duty imposed by sustainability is to bequest to posterity not any particular
thing ...but rather to endow them with whatever it takes to achieve a standard of living at least as
good as our own and to look after their next generation similarly.").
77. See Wrammer, supra note 17, at 30.
78. See John Hartwick, IntergenerationalEquity And The Investing Of Rents From Exhaustible
Resources, 67 AM. ECON. REv. 972, 973-74 (1977) (noting that "invest[ing] all net returns from
exhaustible resources in reproducible capital.., implies intergenerational equity"). Even on this
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Beyond that requirement, however, they would remain largely agnostic
regarding the79market's preference among competing uses of Plachimada
groundwater.
At bottom, this weak sustainability conception depends on a conviction
that improved productive efficiency, resource substitution, and technological
innovation will be adequate to resolve any particular environmental or
natural resource problems that might arise over time. 80 Such faith is the
price paid by market liberalism proponents in order to avoid the prospect of
collective decisionmaking regarding appropriate types and volumes of
environmentally intensive activities for sustainability planning. Proponents
of "strong" sustainability, on the other hand, favor policies that limit natural
resource uses and other human activities to ecologically determined
conditions of sustainability. Under a strong sustainability regime, for
instance, renewable resources would be exploited only at a rate that can be
repeated indefinitely, such as the natural recharge rate in the case of an
aquifer. Nonrenewable resources, on the other hand, would be depleted only
at a rate equal to the rate of development of substitute resources.8 1 Pollution
costs and other environmental externalities also would be addressed through

appropriate shadow prices for exhaustible resources in order to determine the amount of

reinvestment required. As P.K. Rao notes, this task in turn may frustrate the goal of avoiding
collective decisionmaking about the content and significance of sustainability. Specifically, unless
analysts calculate shadow prices on the assumption that some prior sustainability constraints have
been imposed on market operations, Hartwick's rule of optimal reinvestment provides no guarantee
of sustainability. P.K. RAO, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: ECONOMICS AND POLICY 136 (2000).
The form and content of such sustainability constraints, moreover, cannot be determined by
reference to the Hartwick Rule. Instead, they require precisely the kind of substantive policy
judgment that market liberalism generally seeks to avoid. See, e.g., id. at 105 (describing a
preliminary theoretical model for calculating shadow prices in which "various components
of... ecological capital" are maintained above "critical threshold levels which are stipulated to be
preserved to ensure system resilience").
79. Cf. Robert M. Solow, Sustainability: An Economist's Perspective, in ECONOMICS OF THE
ENVIRONMENT 179, 181 (Robert Dorfman & Nancy S. Dorfman eds., 1993) (positing that "[i]f you
don't eat one species of fish, you can eat another species of fish," and that "[t]here is no specific
object that the goal of sustainability, the obligation of sustainability, requires us to leave
untouched").
80. Such a conviction is not limited to proponents of market liberalism, but rather reflects a
near-pervasive belief in the inevitability of progress within Western intellectual traditions:
We view ourselves as managers, in trust for future generations, of a sinking fund of
non-renewable resources. We balance the call of consumption against the duty of thrift.
It is an anxiety founded on an illusion. Necessity, mother of invention, has never yet in
modem history failed to elicit a scientific and technological response to the scarcity of
a resource, leaving us richer than we were before. If the earth itself were to waste, we
would find a way to flee from it into other reaches of the universe.
Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Nature In Its Place 2 (unpublished manuscript available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/unger/englishldocs/nature.doc).
81. See DALY, supra note 37, at 2 ("The whole idea of sustainable development is that the
economic subsystem must not grow beyond the scale at which it can be permanently sustained or
supported by the containingHeinOnline
ecosystem.").
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widespread application of the polluter-pays principle. 82 Lest one balk at such
seemingly draconian measures, consider the fact that even these principles
may not be adequate to ensure environmental sustainability. As Partha
Dasgupta and Geoffrey Heal have shown, if particular exhaustible resources
are sufficiently important and nonsubstitutable within production and
consumption, then indefinite sustainability is simply impossible. 83 This
finding is particularly sobering in the context of exhaustible groundwater
resources, not merely because of the importance that such resources hold for
daily human survival in millions of settlements like Plachimada, but also
because of the enormous but underappreciated role that groundwater plays in
the world's agricultural production. 84
Finally, even when viewed as an analogue to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency
that is to be supplemented by intergenerational transfers of resources that are
accepted to be largely substitutable, the notion of an "optimal consumption
This is because the
path" still may be conceptually problematic.
intergenerational efficiency model that generates the optimal consumption
path in practice requires specification of appropriate discount factors to
represent the marginal product of capital and the so-called pure rate of time
preference. 85 These two elements of discounting will be addressed in turn.
The first and most significant element reflects an attempt to ensure that
opportunity costs are incorporated into intergenerational resource allocation
decisionmaking. Defenders of market liberalism argue that this practice
serves future generations by ensuring that the stock of resources eventually
bequeathed to them will have taken advantage of the best investment
opportunities available during intervening time periods. 86 In their view,

82. See SEGGER & KHALFAN, supra note 41, at 376 (noting that the "polluter-pays principle
refers to the requirement that the costs of pollution be borne by the person or persons responsible
for causing the pollution and the consequential costs").
83. See PARTHA DASGUPTA & GEOFFREY M. HEAL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND EXHAUSTIBLE

RESOURCES 4-5 (1979) (positing that resource substitution may be sufficient to overcome the
otherwise unavoidable decline to zero that occurs when a resource is both essential and

exhaustible).
84. See MARK W. ROSEGRANT ET AL., WORLD WATER AND FOOD TO 2025: DEALING WITH
SCARCITY 155-75 (2002) (exploring the global and country-level impact on future food production
that will result from restoration of groundwater sustainability through reduction in groundwater
overdraft).
85. In some models, analysts focus instead on the trajectory of the marginal utility of
consumption over time, a factor that reflects both the projected rate of growth of per capita

consumption and the declining marginal utility of additional consumption. See Thomas Schelling,
IntergenerationalDiscounting,in DISCOUNTING AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY, supra note 59,
at 99, 100. In practice, the consumption growth rate depends on many of the same variables, and
raises many of the same theoretical complications, as the alternative approach of discounting for the
rate of return on capital. Indeed, in an idealized economy, consumer and producer rates of interest
would be identical.

86. See Arrow et al., supra note 62, at 148 ("[J]ust as earlier generations invested in capital
goods, research and education to bequeath to current generations the ability to achieve high levels of
consumption, current generations are making the investments that are necessary to assure higher
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society best serves the interests of future generations-in the sense of
maximizing the option set available to such generations-simply by ensuring
that the overall stock of useful capital is maintained in some appropriate
general fashion, while allowing particular resources to be devoted to their
most valued uses, free of publicly imposed constraints.
This argument is important, but merits several qualifications. First, to
give the argument practical significance, regulators would need to develop a
more or less comprehensive system of national accounting to ensure that the
aggregate resource base actually is being expanded (or preserved) for the
benefit of future generations. 87 At present, the danger is too great that
consumption may be confused for investment, that environmental
externalities may be inadequately accounted for, and that many important
natural resources may be absent from national ledgers altogether. 88 Second,
if such a system of accounting revealed that the total capital stock was not
being preserved adequately for the benefit of future generations, as many
scientists expect it would,89 then some socially controlled mechanism of
intergenerational capital transfer would be required in order to achieve even a
minimal definition of sustainability. The task of designing and implementing
such an intergenerational transfer mechanism would, in turn, require societal
of the weak-versus-strong sustainability debate
discussion and resolution
90
above.
described
Finally, it bears noting that the opportunity cost argument may suffer
from a subtle, but significant, conceptual flaw. Market liberalism proponents
contend that the decision whether or not to save natural resources for future
generations should be evaluated according to the rate of return for capital in

87. For an overview of attempts to develop such accounting measures, see RAO, supra note 78,
at 205-28.
88. RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 231 (2004) ("Because
conventional national accounting practices generally fail to account for the free goods and services
provided by nature-such as air, water, forests, mountains-they similarly fail to provide any ready
signal when those resources are rapidly depleted or degraded.").
89. See, e.g., Joint Statement, The Royal Acad. of London & The U.S. Nat'l Acad. of Sciences,
Population Growth, Resource Consumption, and a Sustainable World (Feb. 1992) (on file with
author) ("The future of our planet is in the balance. Sustainable development can be achieved, but
only if irreversible degradation of the environment can be halted in time. The next 30 years may be
crucial.").
90. In that regard, it bears noting that most proponents of sustainable development fall between

the extremes of weak and strong sustainability, not at all content to believe that "Plastic Trees" and
desalination plants will provide a safe and reliable, let alone an optimal, substitute for natural
resources, but also not so committed to the ecological worldview to embrace the tight constraints of
strong sustainability. Cf Douglas A. Kysar, Law, Environment,and Vision, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 675,
719 (2003) (noting the need for debate between proponents of strong sustainability and proponents
of weak sustainability). Philosopher Mark Sagoff may be a distinctive hybrid of both extremes. He
regards the notion of "ecological limits" to economic expansion to be a weakly supported strategic
device of the environmental movement that distracts from the more overtly moral considerations
that should govern environmental decisionmaking. See Mark Sagoff, Do We Consume Too Much?,
in THE BUSINESS OF CONSUMPTION: ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 271,
HeinOnline
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order to ensure optimal investment of resources. But, if the savings rate for
natural capital in part determines the rate of return for all capital-if, in other
words, the decision whether to conserve natural resources influences the size
of the opportunity cost that supposedly determines whether or not it is optimal to conserve-then the justification for discounting by market rates of
return seems circular. Indeed, the market rate of interest might be said to
presuppose ownership of all natural resources by the presently living.
Through discounting, future generations are forced to "outbid" present
owners by an amount reflecting not only the strength of their need or desire
for resources, but also the implicit "compensation" due to present owners for
the alternative uses to which the resources could be put during the
intervening time periods. For proponents of sustainable development, this
approach is unsatisfactory: The question of which generation "owns" the
resource under inspection has been, in essence, predetermined by the
discounting exercise, rather than treated as a central question of ethical
governance in the manner that sustainable development demands. 9'
The second primary element of discounting-the pure rate of time
preference-is built on a different (but equally problematic) justification.
Through this discounting factor, utility that occurs in the future is weighted
less than utility today simply because it occurs later in time, a practice that
plainly seems to be in tension with the principle of equal (or at least
equitable) regard for future generations. The pure rate of time preference is
thought to be an appropriate device because it can be found, as a descriptive
matter, in the behavior of individuals. 92 That is, currently living individuals
seem to prefer present consumption to future consumption at some empirically identifiable rate, and thus, analysts tend to assume that a similar degree
of impatience should be applied to the intertemporal allocation of consumpIn this context, however, the neoclassical
tion between generations.
economic lens of methodological individualism-derived from market
liberalism's deep weddedness to individualist accounts of the good-seems
to lead to confusion. As Richard Revesz has noted, there is no normatively

91. Such circularity may not be especially problematic for decisions of modest practical
impact-in which the ultimate outcome might not be affected by the specification of a different
reference case of resource rights and rate of return-but it seems inappropriate for addressing the
type of substantial, long-term issues that concern proponents of sustainable development. In part
for this reason, P.K. Rao insists that "[t]he discount rate must reflect the rate of return on alternative
sustainable uses, and not just any uses, of capital if we are to have a policy consistent with
[sustainable development]." RAO, supra note 78, at 141. By looking at a rate of return that emerges
from a system in which institutional sustainability constraints already have been imposed, Rao
examines intergenerational allocative efficiency assuming that the analytically prior question of
intergenerational distributive equity already has been addressed. This is an important distinction
from optimization models that simply rely on after-the-fact resource transfers to address
intergenerational equity.
92. See FRANK
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REGULATION 180 (1995) ("It then seems reasonable to discount the future benefits to the present
using the same rate that the affected citizens would use, for it is on their behalf that the project is
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attractive explanation for why the consumption impatience of individual
members of one generation should govern the distribution of consumption
opportunities between generations. 93
Welfare economists at one point expressed the view that any form of
discounting is "ethically indefensible" 94 and that, at best, the practice serves
95
as "a polite expression for rapacity and the conquest of reason by passion.,
Today, however, discounting is widely endorsed. 96 Geoffrey Heal attributes
this change of heart in part to "confusion of the issues of intergenerational
equity and efficient use of capital and a lack of clarity on how they
interact." 97 Through the practice of discounting, the fundamental issue of
distributive equity-which resources, as an ethical matter, should be conserved for use and enjoyment by future generations?-is conflated with the
issue of allocative efficiency-which generation, as a technical matter based
on the current distribution of resource entitlements and the chosen rate of
discount, does or will derive more utility from the use of a given resource?
Even if after-the-fact transfers of resources to future generations are offered
as sustainability "compensation," this procedure still seems to suffer from a
basic flaw in the eyes of sustainable development proponents: The efficiency
exercise that determines the level of compensation due will have proceeded
on the basis of a discount rate that assumes away much of the hard work of
evaluating intergenerational equity.
B. IntragenerationalEquity and the Welfare Criterion
A second core meaning attributed to sustainable development is that of
intragenerational equity, often expressed as the notion that "overriding
priority" must be given to "the essential needs of the world's poor,"
especially when policymakers address issues concerning the environment
and natural resources. At the international level, a tentative step toward legal
prioritization of resource uses along these lines can be found in the 1997
U.N. Watercourses Convention, which introduces the notion of "equitable
utilization" as an attempt to balance state sovereignty over watercourses with

93. See Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the
Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 998 (1999) (describing "[t]he ethically

compromised status of discounting for time preference at a constant rate" across, rather than within,
generations).
94. Frank Ramsey, A Mathematical Theory ofSaving, 38 ECON. J. 543, 543 (1928).
95. R.F. HARROD, TOWARDS A DYNAMIC ECONOMICS 40 (1948).
96. See John Donahue, Why We Should Discount the Views of Those Who Discount
Discounting, 108 YALE L.J. 1901, 1904 (1999) (noting that "the process of discounting the future
costs and benefits to current dollars has become standard").
97. Heal, supra note 58, at 423. Cf Lawrence H. Goulder & Robert L. Stavins, An Eye on the
Future, 419 NATURE 673, 674 (2002) (arguing against downward adjustments to the discount rate
in the intergenerational context because "[s]uch adjustments.., blur the distinction between

the ...[]efficiency[] criterion and other legitimate policy-evaluation
distributional... equity"). HeinOnline -- 83 Tex L. Rev. 2128 2004-2005
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98
an obligation not to cause "significant harm" to other riparian states.
Similar expressions regarding the exceptional nature of natural resources and
the need for their collective management have long appeared in domestic
water law. 99 The familiar "public trust" doctrine, for instance, reflects the
notion that private property in water remains subject to the superior demands
of the state acting on behalf of the public interest.' 00 Such a viewpoint is
made profoundly manifest in the South African constitution, which
recognizes a fundamental "right to have access to ...sufficient ...water"
and a corresponding duty on the part of the state to take "reasonable
legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the
[right's] progressive realization."' 0 ' As Robyn Stein has shown in this
volume, South Africa has begun to make good on this commitment through
the establishment of a state water reserve that must receive allotments under
the national water plan for ecological and human rights purposes before any
competing uses such as irrigation or industrial applications.

98. Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, May
21, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 700, 706. Not surprisingly, the Convention is silent with respect to the ultimate
question of which provision--"equitable utilization" or no "significant harm"-prevails in the event
of a conflict. Nations instead are encouraged to engage in cooperative joint management of the

shared resource, a procedural solution that the drafters hope will provide a realistic framework for
resolving conflicts. See Steven G. Ingram, In a Twenty-First Century "Minute", 44 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 163, 197 (2004) (describing the Watercourses Convention as a "pragmatic middle-ofthe-road solution"). Cf Judgment in Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 37
I.L.M. 162, 195-96, 221 (1992) (finding that "new peremptory norms of environmental law had
emerged since [Hungary and Czechoslovakia] signed their original Treaty," and that the countries'
negotiations over a dam project on the Danube River should "take[] into consideration" the new
norms).
99. See Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution,Property Rights, and the Futureof Water Law, 61 U.
COLO. L. REv. 257, 281 (1990) (observing that water law has "always incorporated an intuitive
appreciation of the public, common, systemic nature of the resource") [hereinafter Sax, The
Constitution]; Joseph L. Sax, The Limits of Private Rights in Public Waters, 19 ENVTL. L. 473, 475
(1989) ("The central and unambiguous message is that water is and always has been a public
resource.").
100. See Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 732 (Cal. 1983) (permitting
plaintiffs to challenge Los Angeles' diversion of water from Mono Lake based on the public trust
doctrine); Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine In Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471 (1970) (reviving the venerable concept of public trust in the
context of environmental and natural resources litigation). Something akin to a social ordering of
water uses has long taken place in the riparian water law of the American East, although courts
arguably have not faced sufficiently strong conditions of scarcity to test the resilience and
legitimacy of the rights system. For an illuminating discussion of the history of water rights in the
East, as well as an argument that "reasonable use" property regimes are not necessarily a
"transitional stage" on the way to stronger property rights, but rather "may be an independent
management style, one that is particularly useful with respect to public goods," see Carol M. Rose,
Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of Common-Law Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261,
293 (1990).
101. S.AFR.CONST. § 27.

102. Robyn Stein, Water Law in a DemocraticSouth Africa: A Country Case Study Examining
the Introduction of a PublicRights System, 83 TEXAS L. REv. 2167 (2005). For discussion of the
considerable challenges that remain to be overcome in the implementation and effectuation of the
South African water right, seeHeinOnline
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To some extent, this intragenerational aspect of sustainable development is even more in conflict with the market liberalism framework than that
of intergenerational equity. Proponents of market liberalism might be willing
to concede that the needs of future generations are not adequately registered
by the unregulated market and that, therefore, some combination of marketbased regulation and aggregate capital preservation is appropriate to protect
the interests of future generations. The equitable use doctrine, on the other
hand, applies to the presently living-those who, with varying degrees of
success, are able to assert their own needs and preferences in the market.
Moreover, the doctrine seems to be concerned not merely with wealth
inequality in the abstract, but also with inequality of access to particular
kinds of resources and entitlements. When ordering the Coca-Cola bottling
facility in Plachimada to find alternative sources of water, for instance, a
Kerala High Court judge stated that "[g]round water is a national wealth,"
and that "the Government [must] protect the resources for the enjoyment of
the general public, rather than to permit their use for private ownership or
commercial purposes."10 3 Such a particularized and deliberately public
approach to resource allocation contrasts sharply with the tendencies of
market liberalism to prefer private bargaining as an allocative mechanism for
most resources, and to channel equitable redistributions through ex post
monetary transfers, rather than through substantive alteration of legal
entitlements.
Along with such dramatic contexts as domestic takings law104 and
investor protection provisions within international trade agreements,1 05 the
contrasting approaches of sustainable development and market liberalism are
also well-illustrated in the water context by tiered pricing, a demand-side
management tool that has generated a great deal of attention and support
among water experts. 106 Tiered pricing seeks to harmonize efficiency and

Water, 31 ECOLOGY. L. Q. 957 (2004); Anna R. Welch, Obligations to State and Non-State Actors
Regarding the Human Right to Water Under the South African Constitution, 5 SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT L. & POL'Y 58 (2005).

103. Perumatty Grama Panchayat v. State of Kerala, 2004 (1) K.L.T. 731 (Kerala H.C., India),
availableat http://www.elaw.org/resources/text.asp?id=2551.
104. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Takings and Water Rights, in WATER LAW: TRENDS,
POLICIES, AND PRACTICE 43 (Kathleen Marion Car & James D. Crammond eds., 1995) (noting that
"[u]nder the public resource paradigm, [constitutional] takings protections are troublesome because
they can impede necessary regulatory reallocations of resources," while under the "market
paradigm" strong takings protections are necessary because "the market paradigm only works with

secure and definite water rights").
105. See Marc R. Poirier, The NAFTA Chapter 1] ExpropriationDebate Through the Eyes of a
Property Theorist, 33 ENVTL. L. 851, 852 (2003) (identifying tension between the "guarantees of
fair treatment under minimum international standards and of compensation for indirect
expropriation of property" and "perfectly standard exercises of the police power that purport to

protect public health, safety, welfare, and the environment").
106. See Benson, supra note 43, at 263 (noting that tiered pricing "is a key tool" for water
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equity in water usage by charging a low, subsidized rate for the initial
quantity of water consumed by a user and gradually increasing the rate as
levels of consumption increase. This approach implicitly assumes that the
most vital uses of water-for drinking and sanitation-should be the most
widely available and, indeed, should be available to all individuals without
regard to their ability to pay. Generally speaking, higher volume uses-for
irrigation and industrial activities-are less vital and therefore more in need
of higher prices to incentivize conservation. In this manner, the efficiency
calculus under tiered pricing becomes unhinged from willingness-to-pay as a
welfare criterion, and, instead, volume of usage stands in as a proxy for
socially determined use priorities. Accordingly, from this perspective, the
efficient result-defined not in the sense of maximizing the satisfaction of
monetized preferences, but in the sense of maximizing essential conditions
for human flourishing-also can be described as the equitable result. 107
In contrast to tiered pricing, a water market in neoclassical equilibrium
might well price in the converse manner. That is, so long as producers could
practicably and legally engage in some level of price discrimination
according to volume of usage, 10 8 then vital uses might be charged the highest
per unit rate, given the high valuation that individuals would express for such
uses. Higher volume users, on the other hand, might receive bulk discounts
09
in recognition of their lower willingness-to-pay per unit of consumption.
To be sure, this market allocation approach would have the salutary effect of
eliminating certain low value uses, such as irrigation for ecologically
inappropriate agriculture, that currently persist only through the support of
public subsidization. Those same price dynamics, however, also might
exclude from the market more vital uses by members of rural communities
and the urban poor. As the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) has noted, water inequality already has become a
serious concern for both the developing and the developed worlds.'1 0 By

107. See Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Objectivity of Well-Being and the Objectives of
PropertyLaw, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1708 (2003) (noting that replacing preferentialist welfare
maximization policies with policies based on an "objective list" value criterion may "diminish[] the
number and scope of the conflicts between the goal of well-being maximization and the goal of
well-being distribution").
108. Such "second degree" price discrimination is commonplace in market economies. Even if
it were instead barred by a well-enforced legal prohibition, the basic market logic of pricing would
still be pushing in the opposite direction of tiered pricing.
109. Of course, such a pricing arrangement could also prevail under a poorly conceived
regulatory scheme. See Robert N. Stavins, How to Stop Squandering Water? Raise Its Price, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 14, 1999, at A13 (noting that 33% of the public water systems surveyed in 1998
reported offering volume discounts).
110. According to one analysis, in approximately one half of OECD countries, affordability of

water charges for low-income households is already or soon will become a significant problem in
the absence of policy changes. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE
PROVISION

AND

PRICING
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reducing public control over water pricing, the policy reforms of
privatization and market allocation may only exacerbate such access
problems, even as they bring greater conservation incentives and efficiency
to water management overall."'
Of course, proponents of market-based water allocation are not unaware
of the problem of wealth inequality or of the need to guarantee access to
basic drinking and sanitation water. Accordingly, they typically urge some
form of publicly funded water assistance for the poor in conjunction with
their proposals to introduce market-based allocation."l 2 This approach,
however, reflects the tendency of market liberalism proponents to seek
maximization of the overall value obtained from resource uses, while allowing questions of distributive equity to be handled separately through tax and
transfer programs. 113 The supposed tradeoff between efficiency and equity is
accommodated by allowing the market price for water to rise to its unregulated equilibrium, and by transferring sufficient monetary resources to the
poor to enable them to continue to participate in the market. Sustainable
development proponents, in contrast, generally deny that the efficiency
calculus can be neatly separated from equity or sustainability concerns in this
manner. In their view, the effort to account for significant ethical and
environmental consequences of efficiency maximization through after-thefact corrective devices carries with it an unwarranted stigma, particularly in
the context of a fundamental resource such as water: The language of
"tradeoffs" inappropriately speaks of equity as a "cost" to be balanced
against efficiency; it suggests a sacrifice of welfare rather than a promotion
of life. 114
This perception-that equitable satisfaction of basic water needs is in
tension with the efficient use of scarce resources-may be further entrenched

111. Moreover, given the essential nature of drinking and sanitation water, low-income
individuals who do retain access to water for basic needs in a market allocation may only manage to
do so through transactions that are considerably inequitable. Proponents of market liberalism tend
to assume that market exchanges are voluntary and informed, and that exchange participants do not
exert power over each other. Such assumptions typically apply even in a subfield such as
development economics, which is specifically concerned with the conditions and opportunities of
populations characterized by extreme poverty. See Ravi Kanbur, Economics, Social Science and
Development, 30 WORLD DEV. 477, 477 (2002) (observing that "[m]ainstream development
economics today is mainstream economics applied to poor countries"). In light of the vast
disparities in education, income, and opportunity that presently characterize the world, however,
this approach may be unsatisfactory to advocates of sustainable development.
112. See Andrew Lang, The GATS and Regulatory Autonomy: A Case Study of Social
Regulation of the Water Industry, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 801, 808 (2004) (describing the common use
of "direct subsidy payments to consumers" in order to address access problems following water
market reform).
113. See Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 33 (2002). See
also Kanbur, supra note 111, at 480 (observing that "the separation of 'efficiency' from 'equity' is
part of "the core of mainstream economics").
114. Cf MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT, A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMAN 167 (Penguin

Books 1992) (1792) ("It is justice,
not -charity,
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by the conventional unwillingness of market liberalism proponents to scrutinize the grounds of consumer preference. When viewed through a critical
lens, however, the demand side of market liberalism seems to offer further
possibilities for a convergence between the ethical and the efficient. CocaCola's primary product, for instance, consists of a mildly addictive stimulant,
a nutritionally bankrupt fructose syrup, substantial levels of phosphoric acid,
and various artificial coloring and flavoring agents of uncertain character;' 15
it or its ingredients have been linked with childhood obesity, diabetes,
immunological deficiencies, tooth decay, calcification of growing bones,
osteoporosis, reduced antibiotic effectiveness, exacerbated pre-menstrual
symptoms, hypertension, colorectal cancer, kidney stones, nervousness,
sleeplessness, rapid heart beat, and attention deficit syndrome;" 6 and its
consumption is encouraged by advertising that arguably is exploitative of
children and that, at a minimum, seems indicative of an oligopolistic arms
race that imposes significant deadweight losses on society. 117 In short, rather
than stigmatize basic water needs as an ethical "constraint" on resource
maximization, one might attempt to apply the opposite stigma, condemning
the transformation of scarce groundwater into soft drinks for private sale as a
practice that carries quite ambiguous implications for overall well-being. A
resident of Kaladera, Rajasthan seemed to adopt precisely this view when he
for drinking and agriculture, not for
argued that "[w]ater should be available
' 18
use."
social
no
have
that
industries
The point is not, of course, to suggest the banning of soft drinks or even
to suggest that such products "have no social use." It is instead to unsettle,

115. Although overstated for dramatic effect, this description has long been echoed by more
austere observers. For instance, as early as 1942 the American Medical Association's Council on
Food and Nutrition noted that, "[ftrom the health point of view it is desirable especially to have
restriction of such use of sugar as is represented by consumption of sweetened carbonated
beverages... which are of low nutritional value." American Medical Association, Council on Food
and Nutrition, Some Nutritional Aspects of Sugar, Candy, and Sweetened CarbonatedBeverages,
120 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 763, 765 (1942). Nevertheless, in the years following this call for the
restriction of high-sugar soft drinks, per capita consumption in the United States has increased ninefold, a result that researchers attribute in significant part to the presence of added caffeine in such

drinks. See Roland R. Griffiths & Ellen M. Vernotica, Is Caffeine a FlavoringAgent in Cola Soft
Drinks?, 9 ARCHIVES FAM. MED. 727, 731 (2000) (reporting that individuals cannot discern
whether soft drinks contain caffeine in blind taste tests, and arguing that this finding casts doubt on
the industry's contention that caffeine is added solely as a flavoring agent).
116. Much of the relevant research is summarized in American Academy of Pediatrics, Policy
Statement: Soft Drinks in Schools, 113 PEDIATRICS 152, 152-53 (2004); Griffiths & Vernotica,
supra note 115, at 728; and Michael F. Jacobson, Liquid Candy: How Soft Drinks are Harming
at
Interest,
the
Public
in
for
Science
Center
Health,
Americans'
http://www.cspinet.org/sodapop/liquid-candy.htm.
117. Cf Daryl J. Levinson, Market Failures and Failures of Markets, 85 VA. L. REV. 1745,
1748 n. 13 (1999) (describing social costs of overinvestment in political campaigns and noting that
"Coke and Pepsi are engaged in a similar advertising arms-race").
118. Nagraj Adve, Rising Struggles, Falling Water: Anti-Coca-Cola Agitation Picks up in
2004),
at
24,
(Sept.
Center
India
Resource
Rajasthan,
Kaladera,
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however slightly, the notion that consumer preference expressed in market
transactions provides the best welfare criterion for public decisionmaking.
Proponents of regulatory cost-benefit analysis insist that public demand for
environmental, health, and safety regulation suffers from a number of
informational and cognitive deficiencies, such that governments should
substitute more objectively determined risk priorities as a "correction" for lay
Sustainable development proponents in turn believe that
error. 119
unsustainable patterns of production and consumption reflect, at least in part,
the influence of ill-informed, manipulated, or otherwise unwise preferences,
such that governments should adopt policies that steer markets toward more
ecologically sustainable equilibriums. In light of the long-time horizons
associated with sustainable development planning, the conventional market
liberalism approach of taking preferences as given works to exclude from
consideration many of the most pertinent routes by which sustainability
might be attained. 120 To sustainable development proponents, therefore,
consumption patterns should be analyzed and addressed jointly alongside
overtly moral questions regarding the type of preferences and the type of
culture that society collectively wishes to promote.
Market liberalism advocates naturally might counter that, unlike their
own proposal to correct for informational and cognitive deficiencies in risk
regulation, this approach raises special concerns regarding the coercive
imposition of particular conceptions of the good by government authorities.
To proponents of sustainable development, however, this objection fails for
at least three reasons. First, the notion that risk regulation can be placed on

119. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON 6-7 (2002) (writing that government
specification of "consequences, in as much detail as possible, is an excellent response to the
cognitive limitations of individual human beings"). See also Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner,
Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences are Distorted, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1105,
1107 (2000) (noting that "actual preferences are not necessarily constitutive of welfare because they
can be distorted, in various ways" and arguing that certain forms of cost-benefit analysis can
redress the distortions); Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD.
1059, 1060 (2000) (arguing that "cost-benefit analysis is best defended as a means of overcoming
predictable problems in individual and social cognition"); Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 763-65 (2003) (reviewing HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002)) (describing the dual-process theory
examined by many academics, which describes two processes humans use to make decisions-one
rapid but error-prone and another slow but reflective and statistical-and arguing that legal systems
should institutionalize the second type of system whenever possible); Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of
Fear, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1119, 1123 (2000) (reviewing PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK
(2000)) (examining "the difference between the risk perceptions of experts and those of ordinary
people," and noting that "ordinary people often deal poorly with the topic of risk"); Cass R.
Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61, 62 (2002)
(stating that "when intense emotions are engaged, people tend to focus on the adverse outcome, not
on its likelihood").
120. See Bryan Norton et al., The Evolution of Preferences: Why 'Sovereign' Preferences May
Not Lead to Sustainable Policies and What to Do About It, 24 ECOLOGY ECON. 193, 209 (1998)
("Preference change can be thought of in this context as an alternative to price change. Both
influence behavior, and both are subject to imperfections. We may wish to (and need to) influence
83 Tex our
L. Rev.
2134 2004-2005
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an "objective" foundation ignores the many ways in which conceptions of
risk are themselves pregnant with visions of the good, including the particular technocratic conception of risk that is presupposed by policy approaches
such as cost-benefit analysis. 121 Second, rather than a moment of
paternalistic overreaching, transparent government participation in
preference formation instead may be seen as a desirable counterbalance to
the influence of private actors whose own immense concentrations of wealth
and political power today pose threats quite parallel to those that originally
motivated liberals to be suspicious of government authority. The hope for
individuals to develop and express their preferences through disordered,
autonomous means seems difficult to maintain, unless one is willing to
exclude from concern entire spheres of influence based on an originalist
attachment to one particular, and perhaps long outdated, conception of
Finally, and more narrowly, the phenomenon of
illiberal coercion.
endogenous preferences, discussed briefly above, 122 simply cannot be dismissed as a minor theoretical complication in the sustainable development
context. The foundational nature within any market economy of energy,
natural resource, agriculture, pollution, transportation, land use, health,
housing, and education policies means that governments simply cannot
influencing--directly or indirectly-the content of consumer
abstain from
23
1
desires.

121. See Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectationsof Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1700, 176366 (2003) (arguing that for most people, risk "is not a purely actuarial concept," but is rather a
"complex, textured assessment of numerous variables," including some qualitative variables that are
generally ignored by cost-benefit analysis).
122. See supra text accompanying note 120. See also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKET AND
SOCIAL JUSTICE 17 (1997) ("[W]hen preferences are a function of legal rules, the government
cannot take preferences as given and.., the rules cannot be justified by reference to the
preferences ...");Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J. LEGAL
STUD. 217, 234-35 (1993) (noting that "preference-shaping effects of legal rules cast doubt on the
idea that ...regulation should attempt to satisfy or follow some aggregation of private
preferences"). Cf Samuel Bowles, Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of
Markets and Other Economic Institutions, 36 J.ECON. LIT. 75, 75 (1998) (describing conceptual
problems created for economic theory when markets "influence the evolution of values, tastes, and
personalities").
123. As a practical matter, moreover, the notion that individual preferences should lie beyond
scrutiny has placed environmental regulators in an unstable position. Individual behaviors play an
increasingly significant role in the overall incidence of environmental harms, yet regulators largely
are limited by existing environmental statutes to addressing industrial actors. See Michael P.
Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV: The Individual as Regulated Entity in the New Era of
Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L. REv. 515, 518 (2004) (writing that while "[i]ndustrial sources
continue to be major sources of pollution.., individuals are now the largest remaining source of
many pollutants"). Industrial actors, in turn, naturally are growing tired of the disproportionate
regulatory focus on their activities, leading to a state of strong political dissatisfaction with the
present environmental law regime. See, e.g., Robert J. Klee, EnablingEnvironmental Sustainability
in the UnitedStates: The Casefor a Comprehensive MaterialFlow Inventory, 23 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
131, 168 (2004) (noting that "[o]ne major criticism of the [Toxic Release Inventory] is that it
exempts a large population of potential polluters, including small businesses, non-point sources,
HeinOnline -- 83 Tex L. Rev. 2135 2004-2005
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C. TradeLiberalization and the Law of ComparativeAdvantage
Perhaps the clearest demonstration of the unwillingness of sustainable
development proponents to acknowledge the radical strains of their
framework appears in their ambiguous stance toward trade liberalization.
Proponents of sustainable development usually emphasize the need to foster
"green" trade through widespread application of the polluter-pays principle
or through allowance of liberal exceptions under trade agreements for
domestic policies that aim to maintain society's ecological impact within
sustainable limits.
Beyond these efforts to promote and protect
environmental regulation, however, sustainable development proponents
typically do not challenge the intellectual case in favor of liberalized trade.
Indeed, they tend to embrace it as a critical element of the "development"
side of their program: "States should cooperate to promote a supportive and
open international economic system that would lead to economic growth and
sustainable development in all countries ....
,,24 In recent years, however,
growing numbers of academics, politicians, and civil society members have
begun to examine this commitment to liberalized trade more deeply. Their
questioning, in turn, has revealed several theoretical complications that
suggest a much improved empirical understanding of the effects of trade
liberalization is necessary before its role in sustainable development can be
adequately characterized.
The original theoretical justification for unfettered trade between
nations, David Ricardo's law of comparative advantage, posited a case in
which one nation (Portugal) had an absolute efficiency advantage over
another nation in the production of two different goods (wine and cloth), but
the second nation (England) had a comparative advantage in one of the goods
(cloth). 125 Thus, because Portugal's wine was worth more to England in
cloth than the amount at which Portugal could produce cloth, both countries
stood to gain from specializing in their respective goods. In that manner, the
two goods could be produced in amounts sufficient for both nations'
consumption, but with far greater efficiency than when produced separately
in both England and Portugal. This seemingly unimpeachable economic
logic-which forms a key element of the argument in favor of liberalized
trade 126 -also now enjoys strong empirical support, as vast increases in

124. Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Annex 1, at
Principle 12, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration],reprinted in U.N.
DEP'T OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, AGENDA 21: PROGRAMME OF ACTION FOR SUSTAINABLE

DEVELOPMENT,
U.N.
Sales
No.
E.93.I.11
(1993),
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/confl 51/aconfl 5126- lannex 1.htm.

available

at

125. DAVID RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 82-87

(Michael P. Fogarty ed., J.M. Dent & Sons 1962) (1817).
126. See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 3 (2d ed. 1999) (noting that, despite subsequent refinements, Ricardo's theory "continues to
form the basis of conventional international trade theory"); David A. Wirth, The President, The
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global production over the last fifty years are attributable, in substantial part,
to the liberalization of international trade that has been fostered by the
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and subsequent trade
General Agreement
27
1
agreements.
In developing his argument, however, Ricardo was careful to point out
that the principle of comparative advantage does not hold within a single
nation and, indeed, only works between nations due to the international
Specifically, he noted that "[t]he
of capital.
immobility
difference... between a single country and many, is easily accounted for, by
considering the difficulty with which capital moves from one country to
another, to seek a more profitable employment, and the activity with which it
28
If
invariably passes from one province to another in the same country."'
instead capital could flow freely across national borders, then the global
situation would become no different than the provincial: Capital would flee
England for Portugal where it would take advantage of absolute, rather than
cloth. 129
merely comparative, advantages in the production of wine and
England would gain the benefit of cheap prices for wine and cloth imports,
but simultaneously would lose the employment opportunities necessary to
help support a market for them.
Thus, the critical footnote to the comparative advantage theory in a
world of internationally mobile capital is that nations are not necessarily all
better off under liberalized trade, as is commonly argued.1 30 Instead, only
the aggregate wealth of nations is certain to be enhanced, while any
particular nation may come out ahead or behind. Proponents of sustainable
development, who believe that the distributive impact of economic activity
deserves utmost attention within policy formation, cannot ignore this capital
mobility wrinkle in the way that the most ardent proponents of free trade

RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 393, 399 (2004) (noting that "[t]he Ricardo theory of comparative
advantage is alive and well today in modem trade agreements"). For a review of important

theoretical arguments in favor of liberalized trade in addition to the Ricardian efficiency argument,
see Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Rethinking InternationalTrade, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 347 (1998).
127. See J. Patrick Kelly, Foreword: Globalization and Global Governance, 7 WIDENER L.

SYMP. J. i, ii (2001) ("Globalization has led to greater productivity, the more efficient location of
production facilities, decreased production costs, and higher incomes and world Gross Domestic

Product.").
128. See RICARDO, supra note 125, at 83.

The relative lack of attention devoted to the

assumption of international capital immobility in trade debates has driven some commentators to
engage in rather unusual efforts to underscore its importance to Ricardo's thinking. See Roy J.
Ruffin, David Ricardo's Discovery of Comparative Advantage, 34 HIST. POL. ECON. 727, 734
(2002) (noting that "of the 973 words Ricardo devoted to explaining the law of comparative

advantage, 485 emphasized the importance of factor immobility").
129. RICARDO, supra note 125, at 136.
130. Cf James Gustave Speth, International Environmental Law: Can It Deal With the Big

Issues?, 28 VT. L. REV. 779, 791 (2004) ("With 'trade, not aid' as their motto, many U.S.
policymakers have seen the globalization (market) paradigm as supplanting the need for the Earth
HeinOnline
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have. 13 1 Nor can they be satisfied in this context with the conventional
market-liberal response of separating questions of efficiency and equity. In
light of the absence of strong, representative institutions of redistribution at
the global level-as well as the relatively meager amount of voluntary
redistribution that tends to occur in the place of such institutionssustainable development proponents must feel somewhat ambivalent toward
trade liberalization when it occurs under conditions of international capital
mobility. 13 2
Just as awareness of the fundamental ecological
interdependence of the planet has challenged the Westphalian concept of
territorial sovereignty, the increasing permeability of national borders to
capital migration
challenges the Ricardian notion of universally desirable
33
free trade. 1

In addition to this important distributive qualification, some leading
commentators have argued that free trade in an economy of internationally
mobile capital may be even more deeply in tension with the goals of environmental and social sustainability. For instance, along with the desire to
ensure equitable access to particular kinds of natural resources and
ecosystem services, sustainable development proponents also desire to ensure
34
the survival of particular human communities, languages, and traditions.'
Some argue, however, that this desire to preserve local cultural heterogeneity
may be undermined by the global integration of markets, particularly as trade
131. Cf Paul A. Samuelson, Where Ricardo and Mill Rebut and Confirm Arguments of
Mainstream Economists Supporting Globalization, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 135, 143 (2004) (noting that
the assumption of "zero net capital movements" underlying the conventional free trade model
"smacks of Hamlet without the Gloomy Dane").
132. Such ambivalence would place sustainable development proponents in notable company.
For instance, in developing his "invisible hand" passage, Adam Smith was careful to point out that
the capitalist tends to "prefer[] the support of domestic to that of foreign industry," even if more
generally he is driven by "only his own gain." ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 423 (Edwin
Cannan ed., Random House 1937) (1776). Similarly, Ricardo noted with approval that feelings of
nationalist loyalty cause "most men of property to be satisfied with a low rate of profits in their own
country, rather than seek a more advantageous employment for their wealth in foreign nations."
Ricardo, supra note 125, at 83. More recently, John Maynard Keynes emphasized that the "divorce
between ownership and the real responsibility of management" becomes "intolerable" when
"applied internationally." John Maynard Keynes, National Self-Sufficiency, NEW STATESMAN &
NATION, Jul. 8 & 15, 1933, reprinted in 21 THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN MAYNARD
KEYNES 233, 236 (Donald Moggridge ed., 1982).
133. A host of theoretical and empirical points remain to be addressed here. For instance, the
simplified two-goods economy of Ricardo's example may understate the extent to which England
could diversify its production to remain an attractive location for investment even in a context of
internationally mobile capital. Whether absolute production advantages are distributed sufficiently
evenly among nations to render the capital mobility objection moot in this manner is an important
issue to be addressed. Similarly, the fact that overall welfare gains may be expected to flow from
appropriately regulated trade liberalization remains an important argument in its favor, just as
discounted utility maximization remains an important normative goal in the intergenerational
context, even if not a sufficient one.
134. The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, for instance, observes that
"[i]ndigenous people.., and other local communities have a vital role in environmental
management and development" and that states therefore must "recognize and duly support their
identity, culture and interests."
Rio Declaration,
note 2004-2005
124, at Principle 22.
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expands in culturally inflected products such as media and consumer goods,
and as relevant trade authorities drift from a legal standard 135
of
nondiscrimination to one more affirmatively in favor of market access.
Although it would be a mistake to equate human culture crudely with
consumption patterns, it also would be a mistake to believe that the two are
unrelated. Thus, to the extent that trade liberalization fosters not only
enhanced efficiency in the satisfaction of existing preferences, but also
enhanced opportunities to participate in the evolution of new ones, the goals
36
of trade liberalization and cultural heterogeneity may well be in tension. 1
A variant of this concern appears in domestic water law, where
subsidized irrigation policies are sometimes defended in light of the support
that they provide to economically imperiled farming communities. Although
most water policy analysts in the market liberal tradition agree that "[w]ater
should not remain permanently tied to marginally profitable farms when it
could be used more valuably elsewhere,"' 37 they also recognize that such
efficiency improvements may impose substantial transition costs on affected
farmers and their communities. 138 Analysts therefore sometimes urge the

135. See Chi Carmody, When "CulturalIdentity Was Not At Issue ": Thinking About CanadaCertain Measures Concerning Periodicals, 30 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 231, 239 (1999) (describing
a WTO dispute panel's "famously self-absolving language [which said] that 'cultural identity was
not at issue' when it addressed a challenge by the United States to a Canadian excise tax and
import regulation scheme that was defended as an effort to promote original content among
periodicals circulated in Canada (quoting WTO Panel Report, Canada-Certain Measures
Concerning
Periodicals,
WT/DS31/R
(Mar.
14,
1997),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratopse/dispu-e/dispu status-e.htm#1 997)).
136. Recent modeling work by two international economists suggests that, in a bilateral trade
context where preferences evolve and two countries are of disparate size, the long-run pattern of
preferences in the smaller nation will evolve to match that of the larger. In other words, to the
extent that preferences for goods are equated with culture, "the small economy will lose its cultural
identity." Vankatesh Bala & Ngo Van Long, International Trade and Cultural Identity: A Model of
Preference Selection 5 (July 2004) (unpublished working paper, Center for Economic Studies and
Ifo Institute for Economic Research), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=573263. This is an especially
significant finding given that multinational product marketers seem prepared to incur substantial
costs in order to "develop" a market for their wares, even in the face of strong cultural obstacles. A
favorite example among scholars of consumer culture is the decades-long advertising campaign that
Western breakfast cereal manufacturers have been waging to alter the traditional Japanese breakfast
of rice, miso-soup, salted fish, natto, and other decidedly noncereal items. Survey-Breakfast in
Japan, japan-guide.com, at http://www.japan-guide.com/topic/0007.html (May 2000). After years
of steadfast promotion, the campaign finally appears to be paying off: Although 2003 per capita
annual consumption of packaged breakfast cereal in Japan was only 0.24 kg, compared with 4.81 kg
in the United States and 6.72 kg in the United Kingdom, sales volume growth in Japan stood at
10%. Analysts attribute this growth to the "undeveloped nature of the [Japanese] cereal market."
LEATHERHEAD FOOD INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL FOOD MARKETS: BREAKFAST CEREALS
INTERNATIONAL OVERVIEW 4 (2004), available at http://www.foodlineweb.co.uk/globalfoods/
images/breakfastcereals.pdf. More enticingly, analysts expect enormous sales potential in China,
"if the concept of breakfast cereals can be established." Id. at 3.
137. Thompson, Water Allocation andProtection,supra note 36, at 487.
138. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, Understanding Transfers: Community Rights and the
Privatizationof Water, 1 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 13, 15 (1994) [hereinafter Sax,
Understanding Transfers] (noting
that --water
from2004-2005
agricultural to urban areas create
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payment of compensation to affected parties, both out of a concern for
distributive equity and out of an awareness that compensation may be
necessary as a political expedient to overcome vested interests in the present
state of water allocation.' 39 Along precisely these lines, the recent and
monumental agreement to transfer water between Southern California's
Imperial Irrigation District and the San Diego County Water Authority
includes a socioeconomic mitigation fund to compensate adversely impacted
third parties in rural communities.1 40 Similarly, a newly enacted water
management law in Alberta, Canada, includes a compensation mechanism
for indigenous communities that are negatively affected by water
reallocations under the new scheme. 41 Even these unusual efforts to make
good on the Pareto potentiality of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, however, do not
fully address the concern of advocates of social sustainability: Their interest
lies in preserving the actualuniqueness and diversity of human cultures, not
in compensating for their loss.
An additional and somewhat related source of tension between trade
liberalization and sustainable development lies in the familiar fear that
international competition for capital may cause an unraveling of national
production standards, including labor, environmental, and social safety-net
standards.142 Because production cost is not simply a function of labor
significant losses for people in the agricultural community who did not own, but whose income
depended on, the transferred water).
139. See, e.g., Megan Hennessy, Colorado River Water Rights: PropertyRights in Transition,
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1661, 1664 (2004) (proposing a liability rule to allow damage payments to
parties impacted negatively by water reallocation).
140. Dean E. Murphy, Agreement in West Will Send Farms' Water to Urban Areas, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 17, 2003, at Al.
141. David R. Percy, Responding to Water Scarcity in Western Canada, 83 TEXAS L. REV.
2091 (2005).
142. See generally Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International
Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039 (1993) (arguing that the combination of environmental
regulatory constraints and liability exposure in the United States places it at a comparative
disadvantage in international competition and suggesting that domestic policy changes and
international efforts to harmonize national environmental standards are a more appropriate response
than insulation, bans on products, or stringent duties); Richard B. Stewart, International Trade and
Environment: Lessons from the Federal Experience, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1329 (1992)
(recognizing the global scope of environmental externalities created by economic activity as well as
the "worldwide competitiveness externalities" generated by pollution-reduction measures and
drawing lessons from "federal-type" systems for effectively responding to these externalities). A
similar line of analysis has featured prominently in domestic debates regarding the proper allocation
of environmental lawmaking authority between states and the federal government. See, e.g.,
Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom"
Rationalefor Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992) (challenging the
"race-to-the-bottom" rationale as the basis for federal environmental regulation); Richard B.
Stewart, The Development of Administrative and Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw in Judicial Review of
Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 62 IOWA L. REV. 713, 747 (1977)
(suggesting that a federal nondegradation policy might be justified to force states to adopt
environmental protections they would have adopted voluntarily but for the competition to acquire
new development); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?: Problems of Federalism in
HeinOnline
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hours, as was believed in Ricardo's time, but rather a function, inter alia, of
wages, taxes, and regulatory burdens, internationally mobile capital may be
expected to flock to nations that offer the most attractive package of
inexpensive but productive labor, low taxes, and lax regulations. Of course,
this "race to the bottom" argument is hotly contested, both as a theoretical
and an empirical matter. 143 Some have argued, for instance, that equalization
of regulatory standards eventually will occur upward as more nations
undergo the process of development and experience its tendency to increase
public demand for environmental amenities and to decrease dependence on
environmentally intensive industries. 4 4
To proponents of strong
sustainability, however, this argument rings hollow: Barring extraordinary
and unforeseen technological advances, resource-intensive activities must
occur somewhere in order for more developed nations to maintain the
standard of living that they currently do. 145 Thus, proponents of strong
sustainability harbor real concern that regulatory competition already may be
creating barriers to sustainability and, in any event, certainly may do so in the
future as environmental regulation compliance costs rise and create much
stronger incentives for capital to forum shop.
Quite apart from this question of whether regulatory jurisdictions can be
expected to race to the bottom or to the top is a difference of viewpoint on
the merits of racing at all. To proponents of sustainable development,
regulatory standards should be designed specifically for the environmental
and socioeconomic context to which they pertain. 14 6 Such particularity is
thought to be desirable in light of the extraordinary diversity and complexity
of local environmental conditions, cultural practices, and other determinants
(1977) (opining that a state might unilaterally decline to adopt high environmental standards out of
fear that the concomitant costs to industry and economic development would encourage capital to
move to states or communities with lower standards).
143. For recent contributions, see Jeffrey A. Frankel & Andrew K. Rose, Is Trade Good or Bad
for the Environment? Sorting Out the Causality, 87 REV. ECON. & STAT. 85 (2005) (finding that
trade decreases air pollution); Mathew A. Cole, Trade, the Pollution Haven Hypothesis and the
EnvironmentalKuznets Curve: Examining the Linkages, 48 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 71 (2004) (finding
that the effect of pollution havens is relatively minor); Mathew A. Cole & Robert J.R. Elliott, Do
Environmental Regulations Influence Trade Patterns? Testing Old and New Trade Theories, 26
WORLD ECON. 1163 (2003) (positing that environmental regulations have a significant impact upon
trade); Daniel C. Esty, Bridging the Trade-Environment Divide, 15 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 113
(Summer 2001) (exploring why market liberalism and environmental protection appear to be at
odds); and Werner Antweiler et al., Is Free Trade Goodfor the Environment?, 91 AM. ECON. REV.
877 (2001) (assessing environmental consequences of international trade and providing a theoretical
model that suggests that free trade is good for the environment).
144. See, e.g., Douglas A. Kysar, Some Realism About Environmental Skepticism: The
Implications of Bjorn Lomborg's The Skeptical Environmentalist for Environmental Law and
Policy, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 223, 249-52 (2003) (reviewing studies).
145. Suggestive evidence along these lines can be found in COREY L. LOFDAHL,
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF GLOBALIZATION AND TRADE 48 (2002). More conclusive evidence
remains elusive given the general lack of adequate national accounting for natural capital and
environmental externalities. See supra text accompanying notes 87-90.
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Moreover, proponents tend not only to advocate
of sustainability.
substantive tailoring of regulatory standards to locally heterogeneous
conditions, but also to favor local control over the standard-setting process
itself The international legal principle of subsidiarity, which often is
tasks
associated with sustainable development, counsels that "governmental
' 14 7
are best carried out at the level closest to those affected by them."
Within India, the Plachimada groundwater controversy is seen as an
important test of the government's commitment to this subsidiarity principle.
As noted above, the local Plachimada council, or panchayat,has refused to
renew the Coca-Cola bottling facility's license following several seasons of
acute water shortages, 148 an action that in turn has triggered intervention on
behalf of the facility by state government officials who had supported CocaCola's entrance into the Kerala market. 149 A case presently pending before
the High Court of Kerala challenges the state government's action and will
therefore require the court to determine which level of government has final
authority over the Plachimada groundwater dispute.150 To supporters of the
local panchayat and its indigenous and outcaste constituents, however, the
case represents much more than simply a dispute over intergovernmental
decisionmaking authority. As one Indian protester put it, "Rights 151
over water
people."'
marginalized
of
struggle
broader
the
to
linked
be
to
have
In contrast to the preference for local tailoring and local control of
environmental, health, and safety regulation, market liberalism tends to favor
international regulatory harmonization on the ground that it lowers
transaction costs and facilitates trade. 1 52 Moreover, according to market
147. Orley Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MiNN. L. REV. 342, 382 (2004). See also Bradley C. Karkkainen,
"New Governance" in Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous
Lumping, 89 MrNN. L. REv. 471, 490 (2004) (referring less strongly to a preference for lawmaking
and governance at "the most localized level appropriate to the problem").
148. See supra text accompanying note 16.
149. See Perumatty Grama Panchayat v. State of Kerala, 2004 (1) K.L.T. 731, § 5 (recounting
the state government's argument that it "is sensitive to the concern of the people in the locality and
of the Panchayat, but, at the same time, the interest of industrialization has also been borne in
mind"), available at http://www.elaw.org/resources/text.asp?id=2551.
150. On December 16, 2003, however, a Single Bench of the High Court of Kerala overturned
the state government stay, ruling that the panchayat had authority to suspend Coca-Cola's license
under the public trust doctrine, unless the company obtained alternative sources of water or limited
the volume of its groundwater use to that of a local farmer of equivalent real estate holdings.
Perumatty, 2004 (1) K.L.T. 731. Coca-Cola appealed this ruling to the Division Bench of the High
Court, which ordered a governmental investigation into the groundwater shortage in order to
determine whether Coca-Cola's activities in fact were causing the dire water situation in
Plachimada. As of this writing, no further rulings have been issued and the plant remains offline.
See Williams, supra note 12.
151. Williams, supranote 12 (quoting C.R. Bijoy, an advocate for indigenous populations).
152. See Daniel Kalderimis, Problems of WTO Harmonizationand the Virtues of Shields Over
Swords, 13 MiNN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 305, 339 (2004) (noting the conventional trade view that
"national laws and standards should be standardized internationally so as to maximize economic
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liberalism proponents, the problem with highly devolved, participatory
decisionmaking is not only that it leads to cumbersome heterogeneity in the
standards governing commerce, but also that it creates an increased
possibility of protectionist or alarmist lawmaking. 153 Accordingly, the value
of disciplining regulatory standards according to cost-benefit analysis or
scientific risk assessment lies not only in standardizing and rendering
predictable the results of regulation, but also in tempering irrational public
demands, interest group distortions, and other perceived dysfunctions of participatory governance. 154 To proponents of sustainable development, in
contrast, such centralized regulatory approaches are undesirable both because
they risk descent toward a lowest common denominator for environmental
and social sustainability planning, and because, more generally, they disrupt
the goals of regulatory diversity and sensitivity to particularized conditions.
Finally, some observers worry that liberalized trade may exacerbate the
already considerable challenge of maintaining economies within
environmentally sustainable limits: "[B]y making supplies of resources and
[pollution] absorption capacities anywhere simultaneously available to
demands everywhere, free trade will tend to increase ...the rate of
environmental degradation." 155 To holders of this concern, environmental
sustainability already presents data and governance challenges of a
Herculean magnitude on the national level; allowing importation of natural
resources and exportation of wastes across the globe may mean that nations
face even duller incentives to monitor resource consumption, pollution
loading, and other ecological consequences of their activities. 56 Moreover,
if trading regimes eventually include sharp limits on the ability of countries
to preserve natural resources for domestic consumption, as some observers
expect they will, then the issues of intragenerational distributive equity and
weak-versus-strong conceptions of sustainability will be raised in an even

Globalization: The WTO, NAFTA, and International Harmonization of Standards, 40 U. KAN. L.
REV. 807, 829 (2002))).
153. See generally John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution,
114 HARv. L. REV.511 (2000) (identifying protectionist interest groups as the "common enemy" of
international free trade and domestic democracy and arguing that so long as regulatory authority is
not granted to the WTO, the WTO will not threaten the national sovereignty of its members, but
rather will promote local democracies by restraining interest group pressures).
154. For an argument that "least restrictive means" analysis in the WTO context is roughly
functionally equivalent to regulatory cost-benefit analysis, see Alan 0. Sykes, The Least Restrictive
Means, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 403 (2003).
155. DALY, supra note 37, at 149.
156. See Mathis Wackemagel, Can Trade Promote an EcologicallySecure World?: The Global
Economy from an Ecological FootprintPerspective, 5 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 179, 195 (1998) ("[Bly
encouraging all regions to exceed local limits, by reducing the perceived risk attached to local
natural capital depletion, and by simultaneously exposing local surpluses to global demand,
deregulated and ecologically unbalanced trade eventually reduces global carrying capacity,
HeinOnline -- 83 Tex L. Rev. 2143 2004-2005
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more contentious form. 157 Many civil society organizations fear that global
market integration for natural resources ultimately will lead to a situation in
which water and other basic means to life are subjected to competitive
economic bidding with little or no public oversight.' 5 8 Their concern, in
essence, is that the disputes over Coca-Cola's bottling operations in Indiain which protestors claim that scarce groundwater is being transformed into
bottled soda products for sale to affluent urban consumers while local residents struggle to satisfy even basic drinking needs-ultimately will be
magnified onto a global scale. Thus, to some observers, the ability of
countries to ensure distributive equity and environmental sustainability in
their activities at the national level-the primary level at which effective,
participatory regulatory controls currently exist-may be threatened by even
the most nascent of steps toward a global water market. 159
In sum, critics worry that liberalized trade with internationally mobile
capital disrupts just distribution by promoting aggregate gains in wealth
without a realistic prospect of accompanying compensation to losing participants; endangers local and national communities by constricting the sphere
of public influence over capital and by empowering multinational
corporations to market culturally inflected goods on a global level; confounds environmental, health, and safety protection by making regulatory
policies a handicap in international trade competition or by insisting that such
policies be applied in an inappropriately standardized fashion; and, finally,
stymies efforts to maintain environmentally sustainable national economies
by obscuring domestic resource scarcities through global transfers of natural
capital. Of course, it must be noted that these criticisms cut considerably
against the grain of mainstream economic thought,' 60 and that many proponents of sustainable development have remained more optimistic in their
views of trade liberalization. Nevertheless, all proponents of sustainable development insist at a minimum that issues of environmental and social
sustainability should be addressed concurrently with economic development

157. For an analysis of this issue under the GATT, see Robert J. Girouard, Water Export
Restrictions: A Case Study of WTO Dispute Settlement Strategies and Outcomes, 15 GEO. INT'L

ENVTL. L. REv. 247 (2003).

For an argument that water is a "heritage resource" that states

constitutionally may withhold from interstate commerce in the domestic context, see Sax,
UnderstandingTransfers, supra note 138, at 14.
158. See Rona Nardone, Note, Like Oil and Water: The WTO and the World's Water
Resources, 19 CONN. J. INT'L L. 183, 188-92, 204-06 (2003) (noting that many public interest

groups reject the commodification of water because private entities are thought to lack
consideration of the public's interest).
159. Ongoing controversy over proposed bulk water transfers by Canadian distributors raises
this concern, albeit in a seemingly premature form. See GLEICK ET AL., supra note 33, at 18-19
(detailing the actions taken by the Canadian govenment to prevent the trading of bulk water).
160. See Paul Krugman, Is Free Trade Passe?, ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Fall 1987, at 131 ("If
there were an Economist's Creed it would surely contain the affirmation[] ... 'I believe in free
trade."'); Paul B. Stephan, Has Globalizatdon Gone Too Far?, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 246, 246
(1997) (book review) ("The theory of comparative advantage, which celebrates the potential gains
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planning.' 6' Accordingly, even if sustainable development does not compel
the more radical critiques of trade liberalization that are described in this
subpart, the program's demand for integrated analysis still stands in sharp
contrast with the separationist tendencies of trade specialists, 62 much as the
demand for integrated analysis of efficiency and equity stands in sharp contrast with the desire of welfare economists to remain agnostic on issues of
distribution. 163
D. Summary
By its nature, sustainable development assumes some responsibility on
the part of present generations to collectively identify an ecological baseline
beyond which human economic activity that impairs ecosystem functioning
should stop. In turn, this task entails both an adequate moral account of
intergenerational equity and a trans-scientific judgment regarding the
conceptual and operational meaning of environmental sustainability. To
most proponents of sustainable development, intergenerational equity in
practice entails a duty not only to maintain the stock of useful capital in the
aggregate, but also to ensure the integrity of vital ecological processes and
the availability of particular kinds and amounts of natural resources. Equally
urgent and expansive obligations flow from sustainable development's
requirement that "[a]ll states and all people shall cooperate ... in order to
decrease the disparities in standards of living and better meet the needs of the
majority of the people of the world. ' ' 64 Finally, proponents of sustainable
development maintain that these intertwined aims of environmental
sustainability and of distributive equity are best pursued through widely

161. See, e.g., Rio Declaration,supra note 124, at Principle 4 ("In order to achieve sustainable
development, environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the development process
and cannot be considered in isolation from it."); ILA, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 54,
at 7 (describing the principle of integration as "the very backbone of the concept of sustainable
development"); John C. Dembach, SustainableDevelopment: Now More than Ever, 32 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10,003, 10,010 (2002) (referring to integration as "the bedrock principle for sustainable
development"); Dominic McGoldrick, Sustainable Development and Human Rights: An Integrated
Approach, 45 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 796, 818 (1996) ("The critical importance of sustainable
development is that it is an integrationist principle.").
162. The WTO's Committee on Trade and Environment, for instance, is premised on the notion
that "the competence of the multilateral trading system... is limited to trade policies and those
trade-related aspects of environmental policies which may result in significant trade effects for its
members." Marrakesh Ministerial Decision on Trade and Environment, MTN.TNC/45(MIN) (Apr.
14, 1994), 33 I.L.M. 1267, 1267 (1994). See also Sanford Gaines, The WTO's Reading of the GAIT
Article XX Chapeau:A DisguisedRestriction on EnvironmentalMeasures, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON.
L. 739, 856 (2001) (observing that "the WTO disavows any competence on environmental policy,"
but arguing that "[i]t is impossible to develop an integrated and mutually supportive tradeenvironment policy by considering only the trade dimension"); Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without
Values, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 658, 701 (1996) (describing a "myopic view of trade relations [in which
dispute] panels do not take into account social, historical, cultural, or economic factors that may
explain a country's behavior").
163. See supra text accompanying note 113.
HeinOnline
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164. Rio Declaration,supra
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participatory governance structures that operate at the most local level
practicable, and that display a steadfast commitment to integrated policy
assessment.
Although it is worthwhile asking whether sustainable development so
understood is consistent even on its own terms, this Part instead has been
concerned with sustainable development's relationship to the framework of
market liberalism. One certainly can point to a variety of policy contexts that
suggest harmony, rather than discord, between the two approaches: Subsidy
reform in the agricultural and energy sectors would advance not only
efficiency, but also environmental sustainability and
economic
intragenerational equity; greater attention to underappreciated benefits such
as ecosystem services or nonpriced harms such as climate disruption also
might help to discipline market activity toward greater environmental
sustainability;1 65 some empirical evidence suggests that trade liberalization
and economic growth are associated with a greater "taste" for environmental
"goods"; and on certain assumptions regarding income distribution and
natural resource constraints, liberalized trade can be expected to expand
overall access to fundamental resources such as drinking and sanitation
water. As an exercise in political pragmatism, therefore, sustainable
development and market liberalism proponents might well choose to align
themselves in these various contexts. The remaining question, however, is
whether such alliances would come at the long-term cost of conceptual
clarity, particularly with regard to the less analytically mature notion of
sustainable development.
At bottom, market liberalism reflects the "dream that a fully just and
1 66
efficient state can be attained without the exercise of collective judgment."
The normative attractiveness of this "dream" is at its apex when social and
economic conditions are not unduly inequitable and when particular
resources are scarce but resources in the aggregate are not. Under such
conditions, the market provides an unparalleled mechanism for allocating
scarce resources among diverse and competing uses, while society as a whole
can remain confident that "enough, and as good"'167 resources remain
available in the aggregate to satisfy the needs and desires of individual
members. Proponents of sustainable development, however, do not believe
that contemporary socioeconomic and environmental conditions meet these
criteria, nor do they believe that the interests of future generations are
adequately accounted for-even under the most idealized conceptions of

165. See, e.g., Heal, supra note 58, at 411-21 (describing ways in which improved information
and stronger economic incentives could align market dynamics with environmental sustainability

objectives).
166. Mark Kelman, The Necessary Myth of Objective CausationJudgments in Liberal Political

Theory, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 579, 636 (1987).
167. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 291 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ.
HeinOnline -- 83 Tex L. Rev. 2146 2004-2005
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market liberalism. 168 In addition, the market-liberal tendency to accommodate goals of distributive equity or environmental sustainability through
after-the-fact corrective devices strikes proponents of sustainable
development as particularly weak medicine in light of the enormity of the
actual tasks at hand. 169 Instead, they seek to replace the perceived "tradeoff'
between efficiency and equity with an integrated standard of "equitable
use"-a basic intellectual reform that eschews the value agnosticism of
John Ruskin called the "one great fact,"
market liberalism in favor of what
' 170
that "[t]here is no wealth but life."
III. Private Global Governance: Regulation-Based Markets
The inconsistencies between market liberalism and sustainable
development described in the previous Part suggest that achievement of the
latter will require significant alteration of the institutions supporting the
Nevertheless, even granting the argument of sustainable
former. 171
development proponents that collective decisionmaking regarding resource
uses is theoretically necessary, society still might agree-collectively-that
the political process is so clumsy, costly, and corrupt as to make deliberate
public attempts to define and implement a program of sustainable
development more harmful than an unregulated market or a public policy
focused only on efficiency maximization.172 To many observers, collective
decisionmaking regarding sustainability not only threatens coercive
imposition of particular values, preferences, and technologies, but also
invites a host of practical difficulties, such as the creation of black markets,
the promotion of resource waste, and the exacerbation of transaction costs.
From this perspective, the acts of legislators and other representatives are
168. See supra subpart II(A).
169. Consider, for instance, a report by the International Atomic Energy Agency that an
estimated 1.2 billion people currently lack adequate access to safe drinking water, 2.5 billion lack
proper sanitation, and more than 12 million people die from water pollution, water shortages, and
poor sanitation each year. Consider also the report's estimate that approximately 5 billion people
will face severe or difficult conditions of water scarcity by 2025 if present consumption patterns
continue unabated. Press Release, International Atomic Energy Agency, World Water Day 2002:
at
2002),
22,
(Mar.
Development
for
Water
http://waterday2002.iaea.org/English/PressReleaseE.html.
170. JOHN

RUSKIN, "UNTO

THIS

LAST": FOUR ESSAYS ON THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF

POLITICAL ECONOMY 88 (Lloyd J. Hubenka ed., Univ. of Neb. 1967) (1862).
171. Cf A. Dan Tarlock, Ideas Without Institutions: The Paradoxof Sustainable Development,
9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 35, 42 (2001) (noting that "environmental regulation is a modest
overlay on the liberal institutions of private property and consumer sovereignty," and observing that
the achievement of sustainable development will require deep structural changes to those

institutions).
172. See Richard A. Epstein, Justice Across the Generations, 67 TEXAS L. REv. 1465, 1466
(1989) ("A classical liberal regime of limited government, low taxation, personal liberty, and
private property benefits future generations more than an alternative regime that consciously enlists
large government to restrain liberty and to limit the present use of property for the benefit of future
HeinOnline -- 83 Tex L. Rev. 2147 2004-2005
generations.").
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best explained, not as good faith efforts to pursue the public interest, but as
plainly bargained transactions in which public advantages are sold to private
rent-seekers. 173 Regulators in turn are viewed as overburdened, hapless, or
weak-willed bureaucrats who are likely to overlook unintended consequences
of their rules or to 174
be "captured" by powerful interests with a stake in
outcomes.
regulatory
To some extent, water policy in the United States bears out this skepticism, as heavily subsidized, inefficient water users represent textbook
examples of the kind of rent-seeking behavior found in public choice
models. 175 Nevertheless, the hardnosed realism of public choice accounts
stands in stark contrast to the political optimism that is displayed in much of
77
176
the sustainable development law and literature. From Stockholm to Rio1
to Johannesburg, 178 proponents of sustainable development have urged the
enhancement of opportunities for citizens to participate in environmental
decisionmaking-a preference that sits uncomfortably beside the denigration
of the political sphere that is commonly associated with market liberalism
and that, at least to some observers, has worked to undermine public life and
public institutions in the United States since the last heyday of social and
173. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 25 (1991) (summarizing various economic theories of legislation that
describe how politics is "dominated by 'rent-seeking' special interest groups").
174. Id.
175. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Water Law as a PragmaticExercise: ProfessorJoseph Sax's
Water Scholarship, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 363, 374 (1998) [hereinafter Thompson, Water Law as a
PragmaticExercise] ("Existing water users enjoy significant political power; they are the victors of
the transformative economy and have the resources and connections necessary to kill off serious
legislative threats."). In fact, it often seems to be the existence of these failures of public resource
decisionmaking that provides much of the practical urgency behind the case for market water
allocation. Cf Robert Glennon, Water Scarcity, Marketing, and Privatization,83 TExAS L. REV.
1873 (noting problems of water distribution through the political process and arguing that
privatization offers a more desirable alternative); Sax, The Constitution, supra note 99, at 278
(questioning water markets "as a matter of equity," but noting that they may be desirable based on
"the practical desire to get the job of conservation underway with as much dispatch as possible");
Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Marketsfor Nature, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 261, 26263 (2000) [hereinafter Thompson, Marketsfor Nature] (noting that "markets may reduce opposition
to regulatory initiatives both by reducing the economic cost of regulation and by reducing tension
between interest groups fighting over who will bear the regulatory cost").
176. See Stockholm Declarationof the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
G.A. Res. 2997, U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess., at Preamble 7, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev/1 (1972)
("To achieve this environmental goal will demand the acceptance of responsibility by citizens and
communities and by enterprises and institutions at every level, all sharing equitably in common
efforts.").
177. See Rio Declaration, supra note 124, at Principle 10 ("Environmental issues are best
handled with the participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level,
each individual shall have appropriate access to information concerning the environment ... and the
opportunity to participate in decision-making processes.").
178. See Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Res. 1, Annex:
Johannesburg Declarationon Sustainable Development, Principle 26, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 199/20
(2002) ("We recognize that sustainable development requires a long-term perspective and broadbased participation in policyHeinOnline
formulation,
decision-making
implementation at all levels.").
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environmental legislation during the 1970s. Political theorist Benjamin
Barber, for instance, feels that "the instruments of democracy.., have been
weakened by three decades of market fundamentalism, privatization ideology
and resentment of government."' 179 In his view, this "ascendant market
by which we control the social
ideology ... robs us of the civic freedom
80
consequences of our private actions."1
Before touching on Barber's central concern, this Part first argues that
the theorist may have overlooked certain pockets of progressive activity that
have opened up within the "ascendant market ideology" itself. Specifically,
given the apparently widespread perception that sustainable development
proponents would lose any attempt to press the deep incompatibilities
between their framework and that of market liberalism, 181 a growing number
of civil society organizations, government leaders, and academics have
begun to adapt their sustainability goals to better fit the prevailing political
and cultural reverence for markets. Such adaptation is evident in the
Plachimada groundwater controversy, as protestors have become highly
effective at exploiting Coca-Cola's own cultural salience and multinational
economic network for their political purposes. It also is evident in the
activities of a broader coalition of public and private parties who are seeking
to institutionalize more formal market incentives for corporate social and
environmental responsibility. As will be explained, the activities that they
increasingly promote-such as conscientious consumption and socially
responsible investment182---can be seen as attempts to pursue sustainable
development policy goals through the unlikely medium of private economic
transactions.
Because a more complete normative assessment of such governance
mechanisms is beyond the scope of this Article, 83 this Part instead will

179. Benjamin R. Barber, A Failureof Democracy, Not Capitalism,N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2002,

at A19.
180. Id.
181. See George (Rock) Pring, The 2002 Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable
Development: International Environmental Law Collides With Reality, Turning Jo'Burg Into
"Joke'Burg", 30 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 410, 410-11 (2002) (noting that at the most recent
Earth Summit in Johannesburg, the strong commitment to sustainable development articulated at the
Rio Earth Summit in 1992 "ran headlong into the hard reality of the world's existing economic
order, and the economic order did not give.., much").
182. For more detailed accounts, see Kysar, supra note 44, at 636 (discussing the role of
consumer decisionmaking in the contemporary global economy); Cynthia A. Williams, Civil Society
Initiatives and "Soft Law" in the Oil and Gas Industry, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 457, 461
(2004) [hereinafter Williams, Civil Society Initiatives] (stating that "citizens' demands for corporate
social responsbility... are changing the norms of appropriate industry action").
183. Brief mention should be made of the most important criticisms raised against private
governance mechanisms, which focus on a perceived lack of representativeness and accountability
in the organizations that develop and enforce such mechanisms. More specifically, critics worry:
that private governance entrepreneurs purport to represent a "global civil society," but instead seem
to reflect a narrow, largely Western and elitist range of interests; that they replace mechanisms of
-- 83 TexofL. Rev.
2004-2005
formal democratic equality HeinOnline
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conclude simply by noting that the mechanisms may provide an important
but underappreciated option value---one that exists quite apart from whether
the mechanisms are desirable or necessary as policy tools for achieving
sustainable development, and even apart from whether the framework of
sustainable development itself is desirable or necessary. Whatever else they
may do, the tools of consumer and investor disclosure work to preserve space
for public-regarding sentiment within a market-liberal order that otherwise
tends to deny the wisdom of such sentiment and, indeed, that seems capable
of investing in political and cultural institutions that specifically aim to erode
such sentiment. 84 Thus, at least until the deeper normative and empirical
disputes between sustainable development and market liberalism are
resolved, states may be wise to deploy their "interdependence
sovereignty"' 185 in support of these emerging efforts to infuse the consumer
and investor market roles with expanded social and environmental meaning.
By doing so, they will help to preserve public belief in the mere possibility of
"civic freedom [to] control the social consequences of ... private actions," in
case such collective moral freedom turns out to be as essential as sustainable
development proponents claim.' 86
A. From Plachimadato "Where It Hurts Coca-Cola the Most"
Coca-Cola complains that the agitation against it seems driven more by
an antiglobalization agenda than by specific concern for the groundwater
resources of Plachimada and other rural Indian communities. The company's
Indian website, for instance, describes its opponents as "politically motivated
groups [who] have ... chosen to target just The Coca-Cola Company, using
the Coca-Cola brand name for the furtherance of their own anti-multinational agendas."1 87 To some extent, of course, this view must be correct.
Protestors themselves attempt to link the groundwater dispute to broader
debates over international economic integration and the role of multinational
corporations in developing countries: They liken the company's actions to

disproportionately benefit the wealthy and well-educated; that they threaten to become a sort of
public choice run amok at the global level, in which interest groups promote governance schemes
that are protectionist or otherwise harmful to the broader public interest; and that they unduly
interefere with the sovereign interests of foreign nations by conditioning participation in governance
schemes on unrelated or inappropriate concerns. See, e.g., John R. Bolton, Should We Take Global
Governance Seriously?, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 205, 218 (2000) (arguing that "the civil society idea... is
dramatically troubling for democraticy theory because it posits 'interests' (whether NGOs or
businesses) as legitimate actors along with popularly elected governments").
184. See infra text accompanying notes 219-34, 240-45.
185. See STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 4 (1999) (defining
interdependence sovereignty as "the ability of public authorities to regulate the flow of information,
ideas, goods, people, pollutants, or capital across the borders of their state").
186. Id.
187. Coca-Cola, Coca-Cola India's Approach to Water Usage, at http://www.cocacolaindia.com/water.html.
HeinOnline -- 83 Tex L. Rev. 2150 2004-2005
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"Cocacolanisation"'' 88 and invoke Mahatma Ghandi's memory by shouting
"Coca-Cola: Quit India."' t 9 They also expand the scope and meaning of
their protests by forming global alliances with other organizations that are
targeting Coca-Cola for independent reasons. 190 Finally, they deliberately
promote their concerns to individuals far beyond the communities or even the
nations that are specifically affected by Coca-Cola's allegedly objectionable
practices. As Amit Srivastava of the India Resource Center promised, "[w]e
will take this battle to where it hurts Coca-Cola the most-the US and the
European Union, its largest markets." 191
But Coca-Cola should hardly be surprised by these activities. Both in
light of the company's marketing materials, which seem to invite broad debate by appealing to India's development aspirations, 192 and in light of the
sheer magnitude of the company's present operations and its "Manifesto" for
further global growth, 193 Coca-Cola provides a natural target for otherwise
dispersed and disparately situated political actors. Like no other institutional
force in the world today, multinational corporations such as Coca-Cola
"individualize the global system."' 194 That is, through their expansive
operations, they offer one of the few direct relationships-and perhaps the
only such relationship that is common across diverse cross sections of international societies-that individuals have with the larger economic, political,
and cultural currents that are dramatically reshaping the planet. As such,
multinational corporations and their iconography offer unparalleled global
communicative power-power that Coca-Cola itself exploits when it speaks
out on issues that extend beyond its core marketing function, and that antiCoca-Cola NGOs implicitly acknowledge when they seek to recode the
company's iconography to reflect instead their social concerns.' 95 Similarly,
the fact that other industrial water users in Plachimada besides Coca-Cola

188. Wrammer, supra note 17, at 28.
189. Williams, supra note 12, at F2.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
191. Environmental News Service, Indian Marchers Protest Coca-Cola Pollution, Water Use
(Nov. 15, 2004), at http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/nov2004/2004-11-16-05.asp.
192. For instance, Coca-Cola's primary marketing slogan for India--"Partners in Progress"-attempts to promote not only the company's products, but also the broader economic and
employment effects of its operations.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 3-7. The company's 1993 annual report sounded
similarly revolutionary tones: "All of us in the Coca-Cola family wake up each morning knowing

that every single one of the world's 5.6 billion people will get thirsty that day. If we make it
impossible for these 5.6 billion people to escape Coca-Cola, then we assure our future success for
many years to come." ANITA RODDICK, TROUBLED WATERS: SAINTS, SINNERS, TRUTH AND LIES
ABOUT THE GLOBAL WATER CRISIS 10 (2004) (quoting the 1993 annual report).
194. Lee A. Tavis, Corporate Governance and the Global Social Void, 35 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 487, 540 (2002).
195. For instance, campaign materials developed by the People's Forum Against Coca-Cola
subvert Coca-Cola's logo by depicting a bottle labeled "Toxic-Cola" in the company's familiar red
HeinOnline -- 83 Tex L. Rev. 2151 2004-2005
script lettering.
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may be contributing to groundwater shortages, as the company claims, 196 is
of little moment to international campaign organizers. The Plachimada
controversy provides a focal point for mobilization precisely because it
involves the world's most recognized brand. As such, it links Indian
Adivasis populations, Columbian union members, British consumers,
European environmentalists, American student groups, Canadian cultural
preservationists, and a host of other civil society interests97 that might
otherwise experience the global political landscape in isolation.'
In addition to highlighting what might be called consumption
communities within global politics, 98 the Coca-Cola controversy also
demonstrates a growing sophistication among NGOs in relation to the tools
of consumer and investor market pressure. For instance, the Polaris Institute,
a Canadian organization "designed to enable citizen movements to re-skill
and re-tool themselves to fight for democratic social change in an age of
corporate driven globalization,"'1 99 has published a lengthy Coca-Cola
resource guide containing a compilation of information regarding the
company's social and environmental history, as well as details concerning
Coca-Cola's executives, board of directors, principal shareholders, bottling
contractors, political affiliates, campaign contribution recipients, lobbyists,
key suppliers, institutional customers, and outside professional services
firms. 200 Armed with this information, anti-Coca-Cola NGOs have engaged

196. Coca-Cola maintains that other industrial users, as well as environmental factors such as
drought, are responsible for the water shortages in the area. See supra text accompanying note 22.
197. In this regard, it is significant that Corporate Accountability International, a United Statesbased NGO formerly known as Infact, has recently announced that it will be mounting an
aggressive international campaign against corporate water interests, focusing especially on CocaCola. Corporate Accountability International, Infact Changes Name to CorporateAccountability
International,Expands Organizing:Leading Campaign Organization Challenges Abuses by Water,
at
Industries
(2004),
and
Oil
Agribusiness,
and
Food
http://www.stopcorporateabuse.org/cms/page1189.cfm. This organization has extensive experience
in such campaigns, having waged a decade-long challenge to Nestl6 S.A.'s infant formula
marketing practices in developing nations that ultimately ended in the adoption of a code of
marketing for infant formula products by the WHO. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar,
Taking BehavioralismSeriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420,
1464-65 (1999) (discussing marketing practices that gave rise to this campaign). The group also
coordinated strong consumer campaigns as part of an antitobacco effort, contributing to the eventual
breakup of the RJR Nabisco consumer goods conglomerate and playing a not-insignificant role in
the development of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. See INFACT, GLOBAL
AGGRESSION: THE CASE FOR WORLD STANDARDS AND BOLD U.S. ACTION CHALLENGING PHILIP

available
at
RJR
NABISCO
(1998),
MORRIS
AND
http://www.stopcorporateabuse.org/files/pdfs/Global%20Aggression_2005.pdf.
198. Cf Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy
Coordination, 46 INT'L ORG. 1 (1992) (explaining that "epistemic communities" (networks of
experts who have superior policy-oriented knowledge) facilitate the circulation of new ideas within
societies and throughout the world).
199. Polaris Institute, About Us: The Origins of the Polaris Institute, at
http://www.polarisinstitute.org/about_us/about us index.html.
200. Richard Girard, Coca-Cola Company: Inside the Real Thing, (Oct. 2004), available at
HeinOnline -- 83 Tex L. Rev. 2152 2004-2005
http://www.polarisinstitute.org/corp-profiles/public-service-gats.pdfs/coca-cola.pdf

2005]

Sustainable Development and Private Global Governance

2153

in a variety of pressure and awareness campaigns, such as a consumerfocused "Coca-Cola Accountability Tour" that was held throughout the
United Kingdom, a number of student initiatives in the United States that
have sought cancellation of university soft drink contracts, and a series of
boycott campaigns that have targeted various institutions with far more
attenuated connections to Coca-Cola than traditional boycott subjects. The
Royal Bank of Canada, for instance, has found itself the subject of a pressure
campaign simply because it shares a common board member with CocaCola.201
Perhaps the most intriguing development in the Coca-Cola controversy
takes the form of a hedge fund that has been designed specifically to profit
from a decline in the company's stock price.2 °2 Founders of the fund have
selected Coca-Cola as their initial target in what will become a broader effort
to identify companies that they believe are vulnerable to boycotts and protest
campaigns based on the companies' social and environmental records.
According to the founders, any profits above the rate of return for long-term
treasury bonds earned by the hedge fund's short position on Coca-Cola will
be donated to affected farmers in India, AIDS relief efforts in Africa, and
human rights organizations in Central and South America.2 °3 In addition, the
fund will actively seek to promote boycotts and campaigns against CocaCola and other targeted companies by supporting an affiliated website,
dubbed "KarmaBanque." On this site, activists compile traditional corporate
financial information and relate it to new indicators, such as a measurement
of the degree of "ill will" expressed by KarmaBanque community members
toward a company, and a "Boycott Vulnerability Rating" that seeks to
identify prime boycott targets based on the ratio of a company's market
capitalization to its trailing annual sales.20 4 In justifying these actions, the
founders explain that they are "simply picking up on a trend and giving
people the tools to use. The Internet allows people, activists, from all over
the world to gather, or swarm, and hit a company where it hurts most-in
their stock price.' '20 5

201. CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER COKE, ROYAL BANK OF CANADA: 'DUMP REINHARD FROM

YOUR

BOARD

OR

WE'LL

DUMP

YOU! ',

available

at

http://www.polarisinstitute.org/polaris-project/water lords/campaigns/rbc I 1.pdf.
202. Thomas M. Kostigen, Hedge Fund Banking on Social and Moral Issues, WASH. POST,
Dec. 25, 2004, at D7.
203. Id.

204. http://www.karmabanque.com. Such measures help consumer boycotters achieve the most
bang for their (withheld) buck by identifying those companies whose stock price is most dependent
on consumer sales.
202, at D7.-- 83 Tex L. Rev. 2153 2004-2005
205. Kostigen, supra note HeinOnline
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B. Consumption, Investment, and DisaggregatedDemocracy
The Coca-Cola controversy instantiates a series of dramatic
developments that have been occurring as part of a global shift from
"government to governance. ' 2° 6 The latter concept may be thought to
include all "processes and institutions, both formal and informal, that guide
and restrain the collective activities of a group. 20 7 It may be distinguished
from the former concept based chiefly on the number and diversity of actors,
both public and private, that contribute to its formation, operation, and
evolution. From the governance perspective, the much-noted exponential
increase in the number, variety, and sophistication of NGOs active in global
politics 20 8 reflects deep changes at work in the relationship between
individuals and their governments.
Rather than vertically aligning
themselves within conventional hierarchical types of political structures,
individuals and entities increasingly seem to view themselves as participants
in a horizontal form of democracy.20 9 Principles of behavior emerge on this
horizontal plane, not from top-down edicts by elected representatives or
bureaucratic officials, but rather from bottom-up interactions among relevant

206. Sol Picciotto, Networks in InternationalEconomic Integration:FragmentedStates and the
Dilemmas of Neo-Liberalism, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1014, 1018 (1996-1997) (stating that
"there has been a shift from 'government' to 'governance,' as the central political institutions of the
state have found it increasingly difficult to resolve social conflicts or to reconcile the diversity of
social interests").
207. ROBERT 0. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., Introduction to GOVERNANCE IN A
GLOBALIZING WORLD 1, 12 (Joseph S. Nye, Jr. & John D. Donahue eds., 2000).
208. See U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1999, at 35
(1999) ("One big development in opening opportunities for people to participate in global
governance has been the growing strength and influence of NGOs-in both the North and the
South."). For illuminating accounts in the context of international environmental law, see John
McCormick, The Role of Environmental NGOs in International Regimes, in THE GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENT, supra note 38, at 52, 55-57 (describing the history, influence, and complex
structure of international environmental NGOs); Thomas Princen et al., Nongovernmental
Organizations in World Environmental Politics, 7 INT'L ENVTL. AFF.42, 46 (1995) (attributing the
growth of NGOs to the opening of a "critical niche created by the global ecological crisis, the need
for a new politics, and the inadequacies of scientific management").
209. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Information Agencies,
and DisaggregatedDemocracy, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1041, 1071-72 (2003) [hereinafter Slaughter,
Global Government Networks] (describing "an emerging horizontal conception of democracy,
which imagines self-government as the product of a much richer set of interactions among
individuals and groups in both public and private fora"). More recently, Dean Slaughter has
focused her treatment of "disaggregated democracy" on the interactions that occur between various
sub-units of the state across international reaches, as opposed to the more dramatically cosmopolitan
pastiche of interactions among public and private actors that attracts the attention and support of
many other governance scholars. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 5 (2004)
[hereinafter A NEW WORLD ORDER] (inviting her readers to "[s]tart thinking about a world of
governments, with all the different institutions that perform the basic functions of governments...
interacting both with each other domestically and also with their foreign and supranational
counterparts"). In this manner, she hopes to offer a compromise position between the extremes of a
radically public vision of "world government," which strikes her as "infeasible and undesirable,"
and a radically private vision of "global governance," which strikes her as raising significant
-- 83 Tex L. Rev.
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2004-2005
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stakeholders.2 '0 Distinctions between public and private carry far less weight
in this context, as do distinctions between citizen and consumer, or voter and
investor. Indeed, a critical component of this "disaggregated" democracy
viewpoint is the notion that individuals express "multiple selves operating in
multiple parallel fora to advance their interests and develop their
identities. 21 1
Because conventional channels of government are seen as too narrow
and too rigid to accommodate the variety of ways in which people identify
themselves and associate with each other-not to mention the variety of
ways in which their interactions generate normative and practical disputesnew forms of regulation have arisen. In particular, "self-organizing, selftransforming, and de-territorialized" networks or communities of actors have
begun to "compile and cumulate knowledge, problem-solving capacity, and
normative frameworks. 2 12 The state does not disappear on this view, but
2 13
rather shifts its role to a more passive one of facilitation, not regulation.
Enabling the flow of information, for instance, becomes a critical means by
which states support the effective formation and operation of private
governance networks. Similarly, intergovernmental organizations play a
critical role on the international plane by defining vital policy issues,
identifying key decisionmakers and constituencies, and catalyzing
substantive policy progress through the creation of dialogue channels among
the identified parties. 214 In short, both domestically, where deregulation,
privatization, and a steady campaign of government skepticism have
contributed to a rise of alternative governance mechanisms, and
internationally, where such mechanisms fill an otherwise sparsely occupied
regulatory terrain, scholars have been forced to modify their political theories
to reflect "the empirical fact of mushrooming private governance regimes in
which individuals, groups, and corporate entities ... generate the rules,
norms, and principles they are prepared to live by. 215
210. Cf

HAROLD

K.

JACOBSON,

NETWORKS

OF

INTERDEPENDENCE:

INTERNATIONAL

ORGANIZATIONS AND THE GLOBAL POLITICAL SYSTEM 386 (1984) (noting that at the global level,
"[d]ecentralization has been essential to satisfy the desire for participation and also to deal more
adequately with complexity").
211. Slaughter, Global Government Networks, supra note 209, at 1068. See also MICHAEL
EDWARDS, FUTURE POSITIVE: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 178 (1999)

(describing a similar notion of "multiple citizenship").
212. Slaughter, Global GovernmentNetworks, supra note 209, at 1072.
213. Id. at 1072-73 (observing that the state's role may become "not to regulate directly, but
rather to manage [governance] processes by facilitating problem solving and information pooling").
Cf Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 267, 286-89 (1998) (offering a conception of democratic experimentalism in
which "[t]he chief role of Congress ... would be to authorize and finance experimental reform by
states and other subnational jurisdictions").
214.

SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 209, at 6.

215. Id. at 194. See also Kal Raustiala, Note, The "ParticipatoryRevolution " in International
EnvironmentalLaw, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 537, 572 (1997) ("The sovereign state is perceived
HeinOnline
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An important manifestation of these trends can be found in various
public and private efforts to promote what might be called regulation-based
markets for consumer products and capital investments. The practice of
infusing market elements into public policy has received great attention
within environmental law and natural resources law literatures, as evidenced
by the pervasiveness of the term market-based regulation.2 16 The converse
notion of infusing public policy elements into markets, however, has
attracted comparatively little notice, perhaps because such a notion appears
undesirable or even paradoxical from within the market liberalism
framework. 217 Nevertheless, efforts to engage in collective, public-regarding
action through private market behavior have been a longstanding feature of
the mass consumer marketplace 218 and, as the Coca-Cola controversy
indicates, seem to have intensified in scope and significance in recent
decades. 219 Moreover, in addition to the type of negative campaigns
described in the previous Part, a growing number of civil society
organizations, business leaders, and government actors also are seeking to
institute more affirmative means of promoting corporate social responsibility.
Because these campaigns aim to promote environmental and social policy
goals through decentralized market transactions, they offer an interesting
theoretical bridge between the frameworks of sustainable development and
market liberalism.
Within consumer product markets, for instance, the practice of ecolabeling seeks to distinguish certain goods based on their superior
environmental production or performance characteristics, such as sustainable
harvesting in the case of renewable resources or relative energy efficiency in

to problems and policy, often usurping governance functions traditionally associated with
governments.").
216. Much of the relevant literature is summarized in Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of
EnvironmentalRegulation?,29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 94-127 (2001).
217. In domestic water law, for instance, courts long refused to uphold conservation easements
or to recognize retirement of water rights as an acceptable use. In such cases, the altruistic
preferences of preservationists did not fit the expectations of the legal system, even though the
system was otherwise inclined to promote property rights and individual autonomy within resource
decisionmaking. See Thompson, Water Allocation and Protection, supra note 36, at 484 ("Under
the prior appropriation doctrine... people interested in preserving instream flows for fishing,
environmental, or other purposes were not permitted to 'appropriate' water themselves for use in the
stream."); Thompson, Markets for Nature, supra note 175, at 286-91 (describing legal impediments
to private acquisition of instream rights).
218. Indeed, in an important recent book, historian T.H. Breen argues that American colonists'

experiences as consumers provided critical cultural resources and forms of effective social action
that ultimately helped to enable full-scale revolution. See generally T.H. BREEN, THE
MARKETPLACE OF REVOLUTION: HOW CONSUMER POLITICS SHAPED AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE

(2004).
219. See generally Kysar, supra note 44 (documenting the rise of various forms of publicregarding activity among consumers, as well as political and legal controversies raised by such
HeinOnline -- 83 Tex L. Rev. 2156 2004-2005
activity).
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the case of appliances and electronic goods.220 Similarly,fair trade labeling
seeks to identify goods that have generated a premium above market prices
for the original producer, often defined as an amount sufficient to constitute a
"living wage.",2 1 Other certification schemes concern such process-related
issues as child labor, occupational safety, and collective bargaining
opportunities; animal testing and animal confinement practices; organic
farming, integrated pest management, and other specialized agricultural
techniques; and incidental effects of production on dolphins, migratory birds,
and other wildlife. Although such product labels may be organized as government programs,22 2 they more commonly take the form of private schemes
that are developed collaboratively by civil society organizations, industry
representatives, scientific experts, and other nongovernmental actors.223 In
either case, they properly may be viewed as a form of private governance in
that the achievement of a public policy outcome is made to depend on the
voluntary, decentralized decisions of countless individual consumers.
Similar efforts can be seen within capital markets, where socially
responsible investment funds, activist pension fund leaders, watchdog NGOs,
farsighted insurance companies, and a variety of other groups have combined
to exert pressure on large commercial enterprises to engage in so-called
"triple bottom line reporting." 224 The Global Reporting Initiative, for
instance, is a multi-stakeholder coalition that seeks "to create and refine a
consistent, comparable format for companies to use to voluntarily report ' on
225
the economic, environmental, and social impact of their actions.,
Originally organized by the Coalition for Environmentally Responsive
Economies as a partnership involving social and environmental NGOs,
industry members, accounting groups, and government agencies, the Global
Reporting Initiative now exists as an independent institution that works in
220. See JAMES SALZMAN, ORG. FOR ECON. Co-OPERATION

LABELLING IN OECD COUNTRIES

11-14 (1991)

& DEV., ENvIRONMENTAL

(defining "environmental labeling" as "the

voluntary granting of labels by a private or public body in order to inform consumers and thereby
promote consumer products which are determined to be environmentally more friendly than other
functionally and competitively similar products").
221. See Errol E. Meidinger, The New Environmental Law: Forest Certification, 10 BUFF.
ENVTL. L.J. 211, 247 (2002-2003) (describing "a whole set of 'fair trade' products for which
primary producers are certified to have been paid a living wage, and accorded locally appropriate
labor standards").
222. Particularly when established as government programs, such process-based labeling raises
challenging issues under the GATT/WTO trading regime. See Kysar, supra note 44, at 541-47
("Although the history of international trade reveals many examples of trade restrictions based on
the manner in which foreign goods are produced, in recent years the legitimacy of such measures

has come under intense scrutiny.") (internal citation omitted).
223. See, e.g., Meidinger, supra note 221, at 237-41 (providing an extended analysis of the

Forest Stewardship Council, a worldwide coalition of representatives from the forest industry,
environmental NGOs, indigenous people, community groups, labeling organizations, and other
bodies formed to provide an overall system for monitoring and assessing international forest
certification systems).
224. Williams, Civil Society Initiatives,supra note 182, at 468-69.
225. Id. at471.
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close cooperation with the U.N. Environment Programme and the U.N.
Global Compact.226 Through its collaborative processes, the Initiative develops corporate reporting guidelines that cover the entire range of issues
relevant to sustainable development. Its protocol for water management
reporting, for instance, seeks to present a comprehensive view of how an
organization interacts with the local environment through its withdrawal, use,
and discharge of water. 227 Indeed, if the Coca-Cola bottling facility in
Plachimada were to comply with this protocol, then it would be required to
disclose precise details regarding its groundwater use as a percentage of the
annual renewable supply, 228 the very information that presently eludes
village residents in their attempt to hold Coca-Cola accountable for
groundwater scarcity.
The European Union and a variety of its member countries regard this
kind of social and environmental reporting to be a key policy tool in the
pursuit of sustainable development. They have accordingly moved to
formalize disclosure obligations as a matter of corporate law. 229 Even when
imposed by regional or national law in this manner, corporate social and
environmental reporting still constitutes a significant departure from

226. Global Reporting Initiative, GRI at a Glance, at http://www.globalreporting.org/
about/brief.asp.
227. GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, WATER PROTOCOL 1-6 (2003), available at
http://www.globalreporting.org/guidelines/protocols/WaterProtocol030501 .pdf.
228. Id. at 5, 17.
229. See, e.g., COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, A SUSTAINABLE EUROPE FOR A
DEVELOPMENT
BETTER WORLD: A EUROPEAN UNION STRATEGY FOR SUSTAINABLE
(COMMISSION'S PROPOSAL TO THE GOTHENBURG EUROPEAN COUNCIL) 8 (2001) (inviting large

companies "to publish a .'triple bottom line' in their annual reports to shareholders that measures
their performance against economic, environmental and social criteria"), available at
Commission
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2001/con2001.0264en01 .pdf,
Recommendation of 30 May 2001 on the recognition, measurement and disclosure of environmental
issues in the annual accounts and annual reports of companies, 2001 O.J. (L 156) 33, 33-35
(recommending standardized corporate environmental reporting procedures). Although typically
phrased in terms of relevance to understanding a company's position from an investment
perspective, the scope of such disclosure obligations is understood to encompass a broad range of
nonfinancial factors. For instance, newly adopted regulations in the United Kingdom require
expansive social and environmental disclosure on the theory that, from an "enlightened
shareholder" perspective, risks such as climate change, persistent organic pollutants, nonrenewable
resource use, biodiversity loss, unfair labor practices, involvement in government corruption, and so
on might affect a company's long-term financial position. See The Companies Act 1985 (Operating
and Financial Review and Directors' Report etc.) (2005) SI 2005/1011 (requiring that a company's
operating and financial reviews contain information on social issues and on the company's impact
on the environment), available at http://www.hmso.gov.uk/si/si2005/20051011 .htm; U.K. DEP'T OF
TRADE

AND

INDUSTRY,

THE OPERATING

AND FINANCIAL

REVIEW

WORKING

GROUP ON

MATERIALITY: A CONSULTATION DOCUMENT 15 (2003) (noting that "issues that are of significant
interest to customers, to employees, to suppliers and to society more widely are, or will very likely
available
at
to
shareholders
too"),
become,
matters
of
concern
http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/ofrwgcon.pdf. See also Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An
Emerging Third Way?: The Erosion of the Anglo-American Value Construct, 38 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. (forthcoming 2005) (describing European Union and United Kingdom disclosure law
HeinOnline -- 83 Tex L. Rev. 2158 2004-2005
developments).
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conventional regulatory approaches to public policy goals such as
Unlike conventional
environmental sustainability or social equity.
nothing beyond the
mandates
regime
a
disclosure
approaches, the state in
provision of information to interested nonstate actors who, in turn, are
believed likely to utilize such information in ways that promote collectively
desirable standards of behavior. 230 As Orly Lobel has noted, governance
approaches of this nature offer "a vibrant, alternative ethos to two
oppositional orthodoxies-regulation and deregulation., 23 1 They also might
be said to offer a useful conceptual linkage between the otherwise
irreconcilable paradigms of sustainable development and market liberalism.
By leaving intact the basic norms of private property, consumer
sovereignty, and shareholder supremacy, disclosure obligations do little
violence to the framework of market liberalism, yet they simultaneously offer
individuals a vehicle for pursuing collective goals that the framework tends
to discount or exclude. 232 The investor who channels her funds to socially
responsible firms engages in a private economic act that is of foundational
importance to market liberalism, yet her act simultaneously seems to express
a judgment that market rates of return should not come at the expense of
workers, the environment, or future generations. She seeks, therefore, to
self-impose the very type of sustainability constraint that neoclassical
economic growth theory has been slow to recognize as necessary within its
vision of an intergenerational free market. 33 Similarly, the consumer who
purchases sustainably harvested, fairly traded products in one sense

230. See COMMISSION

OF THE EUROPEAN

COMMUNITIES,

COMMUNICATION

FROM THE

COMMISSION CONCERNING CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: A BUSINESS CONTRIBUTION TO
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 6 (2002) (noting that enhanced disclosure enables consumers to
"reward socially and environmentally responsible firms" and financial stakeholders to identify the
"success and risk factors inherent in a company and its responsiveness to public opinion"),
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment-social/soc-dial/csr/csr2002-en.pdf. See also
Giandomenico Majone, The New European Agencies: Regulation by Information, 4 J. EUR. PUB.
POL'Y 262, 265 (1997) (noting that regulation by information operates by attempting "to change
behavior indirectly, either by changing the structure of incentives of the different policy actors, or
by supplying the same actors with suitable information"); John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams,
Engage, Embed, and Embellish: Theory and Practice in the Corporate Social Responsibility
Movement 55 (Mar. 23, 2005) (unpublished manuscript) ("Even in the U.K., where the national
government has taken an overt, top-down regulatory role, what is regulated is disclosure, not
behavior; behavior will be determined through a private discourse in which markets will
at
available
say."),
ultimate
the
have
presumably
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstractid=691521.
231. Orly Lobel, Setting the Agenda for New Governance Research, 89 MINN. L. REV. 498,499

(2004). See also Slaughter, Global Government Networks, supra note 209, at 1065 (noting that the
"basic paradigm for global regulatory processes is the promulgation of performance standards,
codes of best practices, and other aspirational models based on compiled comparative
information").
232. Cf Jack Goldsmith, Liberal Democracy and Cosmopolitan Duty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1667,
1694 (2003) (noting that "cosmopolitan action by [civil society organizations] is, all things equal,
more legitimate than cosmopolitan action by liberal democracies precisely because centralized
coercion is not needed in the former case").
HeinOnline -- 83 Tex L. Rev. 2159 2004-2005
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reinforces the primacy of market transactions; yet, her purchase also seems to
condemn the ideas that particular living species or natural resources are not
worth preserving for future generations, or that after-the-fact transfer
payments are adequate to achieve intragenerational distributive equity. In
short, by adopting an integrationist approach to investor and consumer
preference-in which individuals are empowered and encouraged to evaluate
personal desires jointly alongside expected impacts of market activity on
other parties and other life forms-the practices of responsible investment
and ethical consumption accept market liberalism's placement of individual
choice as the central welfare criterion for societal decisionmaking, but
simultaneously reject its view that efficiency, equity, and sustainability are
separable goals requiring separate instruments of satisfaction and control.
C. The Self-Reinforcing Primacy of Market Liberalism
As one can see, the effort to promote sustainable development through
market pressure assumes a variety of forms, ranging from campaigns by civil
society organizations to devalue a firm's reputational capital through
boycotts, counteradvertisements, and other purely private means, to publiclyimposed legal requirements that firms disclose social and environmental
information to consumers and investors. Because environmental law in
general has evolved from a system of "centralized planning to a more
decentralized, inclusive system that increasingly relies on markets and on
voluntary compliance with environmental norms,"' 234 it is only natural that
civil society groups would shift much of their attention to influencing market
incentives and market structures in this manner. By linking consumer
product sales and securities investments with broader social and
environmental issues, these groups attempt to close the critical gap that they
believe exists between the aims of shareholder wealth maximization and
stakeholder welfare maximization. The founders of the anti-Coca-Cola
hedge fund, for instance, pledged to continue their brand of guerilla
capitalism "until Coca-Cola's share price fully reflects the damage done by
the corporation.' 23 5
Naturally, many observers are displeased with these developments. In a
well-publicized example earlier this year, the chairman of Shell
acknowledged that climate change threatens "disaster" for the world, but
insisted that "a regulatory environment has to be determined by
government," rather than by market-based efforts to extract voluntary
commitments or behavioral changes from corporations.2 36 Similarly, a recent

234. Tarlock, supra note 171, at 41.
235. Max Keiser, KannabanQue. ..It's Time to Take Down Coca-Cola, THE ECOLOGIST, Dec.
2004-Jan. 2005, at 14.
236. He continued: "Whether you like it or not, we live in a capitalist society. If we at Shell
83 Texfuel
L. Rev.
2160 2004-2005
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while there was demand for them, we
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survey in The Economist objected to the growing corporate social responsibility movement by arguing that properly structured and regulated markets
serve the public good without need for any additional constraints on
corporate decisionmaking.237
Although the editors recognized the
importance of "public intervention" in order to ensure sustainable
development,2 38 they nevertheless sought to preserve the dominant
conception of corporate governance by deploying the now-familiar separationist tendency of market liberalism: Private corporations should be
permitted-indeed required-to pursue the single maximand of shareholder
value, while concerns regarding distributive equity, environmental harm, and
other consequences of corporate activity should be left to the "political
process. 239
This separationist approach to policymaking assumes that the success or
failure of public action is independent of the behavior of those private actors
who are sought to be charged with duties of social and environmental
responsibility. However, the same economic forces that discipline firms and
managers to pursue the maximization of shareholder value also might lead
them to seek the minimization of regulatory burdens. 240 Shell's long-time
membership and support of an energy industry lobbying group, for instance,
goes a long way toward explaining why the international community until
recently lacked even the rudiments of the "regulatory environment" that its
chairman now acknowledges is necessary. 241 Similarly, Coca-Cola in recent
years has focused its direct U.S. political contributions on congressional
representatives who exercise oversight of federal nutrition policy, and who
support legislation to protect the food industry from obesity-related tort
lawsuits. 242 The company also has spent millions of dollars in the United
States on more specific lobbying efforts, such as a successful campaign to
block state legislation in Texas that would have financed public water

would fail as a company." Saeed Shah, Shell Boss Warns of Global Warming "Disaster",THE
INDEPENDENT, Jan. 26, 2005, availableat 2005 WLNR 1770807.
237. Clive Crook, The Good Company: A Survey of Corporate Social Responsibility, THE
ECONOMIST, Jan. 22, 2005, at 4 ("[G]etting the most out of capitalism requires public intervention
of various kinds, and a lot of it: taxes, public spending, regulation in many different areas of
business activity. It also requires corporate executives to be accountable-but to the right people
and in the right way.").
238. Id.
239. Cf supra text accompanying note 72. See also Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion
of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of Modern Policy and CorporateLaw, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1, 5258 (2004) (describing arguments that "shareholder primacy" improves corporate management

performance and that making corporations responsible for social concerns would actually create
opportunities and incentives for managment to self-deal).
240. See Chen & Hanson, supra note 239, at 111-21.
241. See Douglas A. Kysar & James Salzman, Environmental Tribalism, 87 MINN. L. REV.
1099, 1123-25 (2003) (describing oil companies' efforts to influence public debate about global
warming by funding NGOs).
HeinOnline
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infrastructure improvements through a five cent tax on bottled water.243 In
light of such activities, proponents of sustainable development justifiably
might fear a whipsaw effect from the insistence that shareholder wealth
maximization and public policy goals must be pursued independently.
One can go further. The regulated community might have an interest
not only in defeating or distorting particular policy initiatives, but also in
promoting a cultural and ideological climate in which public action more
generally is viewed with derision. For instance, in crude historical outline,
one might say that Milton Friedman's legendary 1970 essay extolling the
shareholder maximization model of corporate responsibility, 244 which was
later famously applied by William Simon and Irving Kristol to the exercise
of corporate philanthropy, 245 gradually led large commercial enterprises in
the United States to view charitable support of educational, cultural, and
political institutions as a form of investment that, like all other aspects of
their business, should produce an adequate return. Moreover, a veritable
guidebook for philanthropic investment consistent with this view was
provided by an influential memorandum written to the leadership of the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce by soon-to-be Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell
in 1971, right at the height of an extraordinary bipartisan binge of
environmental lawmaking.24 6 As journalism historian Jerry Landay notes,
Powell's call for long-term intellectual investment was answered by several
prominent, wealthy conservatives who proceeded to fund think tanks,
research centers, endowed professorships, scholarly journals, student groups,
media organizations, and other tools for promoting the ideology of
"American Free Enterprise." 247 The efforts of these various individuals and
organizations to consolidate conservative power and to reshape American
politics were so successful that, by the mid-1990s, "[flor the first time in the

243. Id., § 3.4.
244. Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine-The Social Responsibility of Business Is to
IncreaseIts Profits,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, at SM17.
245. WILLIAM E. SIMON, A TIME FOR TRUTH 230 (1978) ("[F]unds generated by
business... must rush by multimillions to the aid of liberty... to funnel desperately needed funds
to scholars, social scientists, writers and journalists who understand the relationship between
political and economic liberty."). See FRANK KOCH, THE NEW CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY: How

SOCIETY AND BUSINESS CAN PROFIT 129 (1979) ("[W]hen you give away your stockholders'
money, your philanthropy must serve the longer-term interest of the corporation. Corporate

philanthropy should not be, cannot be disinterested.") (quoting Irving Kristol).
246. Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Eugene B. Sydnor, Jr., Chairman, U.S.
Chamber of Commerce Education Committee (Aug. 23, 1971), published as The Powell
Memorandum, Washington Rep., Supp. No. 2900 (U.S. Chamber of Commerce 1971), availableat

http://www.mediatransparency.org/stories/powellmanifesto.htm. As Oliver Houck notes, Powell's
confidential memorandum was published by the Chamber of Commerce after it was leaked to a
syndicated newspaper columnist. Oliver A. Houck, On the Limits of Charity: Lobbying, Litigation,
and Electoral Politics by Charitable Organizations Under the Internal Revenue Code and Related
Laws, 69 BROOK. L. REv. 1, 31 n.178 (2003).
247. See Jerry M. Landay, The Powell Manifesto: How a Prominent Lawyer's Attack Memo
HeinOnline -- 83 Tex L. Rev. 2162 2004-2005
ChangedAmerica, at http://www.mediatransparency.org/stories/powell.htm
(Aug. 20, 2002).
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three-decade long history of modem environmental
law, consensus legisla248
option.,
viable
politically
a
longer
no
tion was
Although vastly oversimplified,249 this account is generally
corroborated by commentators who are both critical and laudatory of the late
twentieth century rise of popular conservative intellectualism in the United
States. 250 For purposes of this Article, the important point simply is that the
historical and cultural contingency of preferences should be taken seriously,
not only because it confounds attempts to remain agnostic regarding the
content of preferences in the public sphere, 25 1 but also because it highlights
possible self-reinforcing tendencies within the framework of market
liberalism itself. Whatever one's view regarding its normative implications,
the long-term investment in ideological change championed by Powell and
others seems to have yielded precisely the desired return: "An opinion poll
taken in 1964 showed 62 percent of the respondents trusting the government
to do the right thing; by 1994 the number had dwindled to 19 percent. 25 2
In essence, market liberalism seems to give rise to its own forces for
reasserting and strengthening the perception of its dominance. Accordingly,
the growing effort of sustainable development proponents to seek mechanisms of private global governance might simply reflect a concession to, or
even a consequence of, market liberalism's self-reinforcing primacy. If that
claim is accurate, then the most pertinent question arising out of ethical consumption and socially responsible investment is not whether such governance
mechanisms will be sufficient to ensure sustainable development, but instead
whether they can be maintained long enough to generate economically benefited constituencies that, in turn, will be capable of investing in the
mechanisms' long-term political and cultural success. Here again, the state
cannot maintain a neutral position. For a variety of reasons-because
markets frequently cannot be relied on to generate appropriate levels of

248. LAZARUS, supra note 88, at 153.
249. For a much more extensive treatment that couples historical details with a social
psychological account of how certain schemas have come to dominate policymaking, such as the

shareholder wealth maximization schema of corporate governance and the efficiency-equity
separation schema of law and economics, see generally Chen & Hanson, supra note 239.
250. See JOHN MILLER, STRATEGIC INVESTMENT

IN IDEAS: How Two

FOUNDATIONS

RESHAPED AMERICA 5-7 (2003) (describing the "remarkable achievement[s] of the modem

intellectual conservative movement with focus on the Olin and Bradley Foundations); James
Piereson, You Get What You Pay For: Conservative PhilanthropistsInvested In Ideas, And The
Payoff Was Huge, WALL ST. J., July 21, 2004, at A 10 (describing successes of the conservative
foundation movement of the 1970s and calling for a "new generation of conservative
philanthropists").
251. See supra text accompanying notes 110-16.
252. Lewis H. Lapham, Tentacles OfRage: The Republican PropagandaMill, A BriefHistory,
HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Sept. 2004, at 31, 39. One can tell a similar tale regarding post-war
investment by commercial interests in the development and maintenance of an American culture
inclined to view commodified purchase as a primary means of expression, identity formation, and
civic engagement. See generally LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMER'S REPUBLIC: THE POLITICS OF
HeinOnline
-- 83 (2003).
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disclosure regarding social and environmental impacts of production,
because various parties have begun to seek government aid in discouraging
even the voluntary disclosure of such information, and because, in any event,
disclosure regimes cannot be determined by reference to preferences, but
instead partially determine preferences 253-the public role will be both
critical and unavoidable.
IV. Conclusion: The Real Thing?
During the lead-up to the U.N. World Summit on Sustainable
Development, which was held in Johannesburg, South Africa in 2002, two
points of consensus emerged among delegates and observers: first, "that
progress in implementing sustainable development ha[d] been extremely
disappointing since the 1992 Earth Summit, with poverty deepening and
environmental degradation worsening, 25 4 ; and second, that little if any
formal multilateral action was likely to be achieved or even agreed to in principle at Johannesburg, despite the overwhelming sense that necessary
progress had been lacking.25 5 The reason for the second of these grim
assessments had to do with the perceived obstructionist position of the
United States, which had forced negotiators to abandon more ambitious goals
for the Summit and to instead embrace what became known as "Type II
deliverables",256-- essentially uncoordinated, voluntary projects and
agreements among individual nations, private corporations, NGOs, and other
actors that in some fashion were thought to contribute to the pursuit of
sustainable development. All told, 280 "public-private partnerships" along
these lines were announced before or during Johannesburg,25 7 including 25
U.S. partnerships representing total investments of $125 million.2 58

253. See Kysar, Regulation of Consumer Choice, supra note 44, at 625-32 (summarizing
evidence that consumer preferences, and in particular altruistic consumer preferences, are contextdependent, such that regulators cannot determine product information disclosure policies solely by
reference to preferences, and instead must make independently reasoned normative judgments).
254. Pring, supra note 181, at 413-14.
255. Id.
256. See Partnerships/Initiatives to Strengthen the Implementation of Agenda 21 (To be
elaborated by interested parties in preparation for the World Summit on Sustainable Development
for launching at the Summit): Explanatory note by the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee,
U.N.
2002
World
Summit
on
Sustainable
Development,
at
http://www.johannesburgsummit.org/htmldocuments/prep2final-papers/wssddescription-oLpartn
erships2 ("These 'second type' of outcomes would consist of a series of commitments and actionoriented coalitions focused on deliverables and would contribute in translating political
commitments into action.").
257. United
Nations,
Johanesburg
Summit
2002,
at
4
(Sept.
2002),
at
http://www.johannesburgsummit.org/htmldocuments/summit-docs/2009_keyoutcomescommitme
nts.doc (stating that one of the key outcomes was "[aictively promot[ing] corporate responsibility
and accountability, including through the full development and effective implementation of
intergovernmental agreements and measures, international initiatives and public-private
partnerships, and appropriate national regulations").
258. Pring, supra note HeinOnline
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As the conference sponsors noted, these developments represented
something of a sea change in the practice of international environmental law:
Whereas previous global environmental summits had produced important
multilateral declarations, treaties, and other international law documents,
Johannesburg's more narrow, practical approach represented "a major
departure... that could have a major effect on the way the international
community approaches problem solving in the future." 259 In one sense, the
Summit's central focus on public-private partnerships and other bottom-up
approaches to achieving sustainable development simply reflects the vision
of disaggregated democracy that political theorists have offered in recent
years to explain the overall shift from government to governance. 260 In a
more challenging sense, however, Johannesburg also seems to reflect the
creeping influence at the global level of market liberalism, particularly with
respect to the framework's exaltation of the private sphere and corresponding
denigration of the public sphere. The United States crisply projected such a
view at Johannesburg when it emphasized the need to prefer the "concrete
projects" of private actors over the "paper agreements" of states in the pursuit of sustainable development.2 6' Many observers regarded this U.S. stance
as awkwardly opportunistic: In their view, having contributed to the failure
of numerous international "paper agreements" in the past, the United States
and its constituents now sought to benefit from the perception of those
agreements' inefficacy.262
This Article has suggested that similar self-fulfilling prophesies may be
at work within the political philosophy of market liberalism and that,
accordingly, certain emerging mechanisms of private global governance may
represent an important compromise position for states to support while the
deeper struggle between sustainable development and market liberalism
continues. Undoubtedly, the practices of conscientious consumption and
socially responsible investment will appear to be modest or inadequate policy
devices to most proponents of environmental sustainability and distributive
equity. Such regulation-based market approaches depend on voluntary,
altruistic behavior in the context of what conventionally are seen as profound
collective action problems that necessitate strong, coordinated public

259. Johannesburg Summit 2002, What's New, Feature Story, The Johannesburg Summit Test:

What Will Change?, at http://www.johannesburgsummit.org/html/whatsnew/feature-story4l.html.
See also Edith Brown Weiss, The Emerging Structure of InternationalEnvironmentalLaw, in THE
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT, supra note 38, at 98, 102 ("In international environmental law, the most
important development for the next century may be the emerging interaction of intergovernmental
environmental law with transnational environmental law developed primarily by the private
sector ...").
260. See supra subpart Il1(B).
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HeinOnline -- 83 Tex L. Rev. 2165 2004-2005
262. Id.

2166

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 83:2109

action. 263 Nevertheless, such practices remain significant because they
provide individuals with an outlet for expressing public values through mediums that simultaneously appear within market liberalism as central theaters
of choice, opportunity, and responsibility. Indeed, given that the framework
of market liberalism appears to exert a powerful and perhaps self-reinforcing
influence over political and cultural life, individuals may well come to view
acts of public-regarding consumption and investment as their most
appropriate mechanisms for influencing the policies and conditions of a
deregulated, privatized, and globalized world. The primary importance,
therefore, of environmental and social disclosure programs may lie not in
their ability to fulfill the actual policy functions of more traditional regulatory approaches, but rather in their capacity to preserve the kind of space for
public-regarding sentiment that sustainable development regards as minimally necessary, and that market liberalism regards as maximally suspicious.

263. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968)
(famously using the example of pasture overgrazing to illustrate the problem of overuse of common
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